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Tarkastelen pro gradu – tutkielmassani sitä, miten nk. asenteenilmaisimet esiintyvät akateemisessa 
kielessä peliteorian tieteenalan aikakausjulkaisuartikkeleissa.  
Peliteoria on sovelletun matematiikan osa-alue, joka tutkii ihmisten (tai ’agenttien’) välistä strategista 
vuorovaikutusta. 1940-luvulla syntyneen peliteorian ytimessä on ajatus, jonka mukaan agentit 
toimivat hyötynsä maksimoimisessa strategisesti, ottaen huomioon muiden agenttien strategiat. 
Peliteoriaa on sovellettu niin talous-, yhteiskunta-, kieli- kuin luonnontieteissäkin. 
Tutkimukseni teoria pohjaa aiempaan työhön tieteenalojen asenteenilmaisimien käytöstä (Hyland 
2005, McGrath & Kuteeva 2011). Aiemmassa kirjallisuudessa asenteenilmaisinten määrää eri 
tieteenalojen tutkimusartikkeleissa on tutkittu, ja eroavaisuuksien pohjalta tieteenalojen jakoa etenkin 
luonnontieteisiin ja humanistisiin tieteenaloihin. 
Tutkimusmateriaalini on kerätty vertaisarvioidusta tieteellisestä aikakausjulkaisusta International 
Journal of Game Theory. Otos koostuu 11 tutkimusartikkelista vuosilta 1998-2013. 
Tutkimusasettelussani asenteenilmaisimet ovat jaoteltu neljään luokkaan: varauksiin (hedge), 
vahvistajiin (booster), asenteen osoittajiin (attitude marker) ja itsen mainintoihin (self-mention). Jako 
on tehty Hylandin (2005) aiemman tutkimuksen mukaan, jotta tulosten tarkastelu muihin 
tieteenaloihin nähden on mahdollista. 
Tuloksissa määrällisellä tiedolla tarkastellaan asenteenilmaisimien yleisyyttä sekä sitä mikä osuus 
kullakin neljällä kategorialla on asenteenilmaisimien kokonaismäärästä. Niiden asiayhteyttä ja käytön 
monimuotoisuutta havainnollistetaan materiaalista poimittujen esimerkkien avulla. 
Asenneilmaisimien käyttö on merkki akateemisen kielen retorisesta luonteesta, ja näyttää kuinka 
kirjoittajat argumentoivat väittämiään. 
Tarkastelussani selviää, että peliteoriassa on paljon yhteistä teoreettisen matematiikan kanssa, mutta 
siihen verrattuna peliteoriassa on eroavaisuuksia itsen mainintojen ja asenteen osoittajien osuuksissa. 
Matematiikka ja peliteoria eroavat myös muista luonnontieteellisistä aineista, joten jaottelu pelkkiin 
luonnontieteisiin ja humanistisiin tieteisiin ei asenteenilmaisimien osalta vaikuta yksinkertaiselta. 
Varaukset ja vahvistajat esiintyvät peliteoriassa osassa tapauksista pareittain tai ryhmissä, ja niitä 
käytetään monipuolisesti sekä omien että aiemman kirjallisuuden väitteiden merkitsemisessä 
epävarmaksi tai varmaksi. 
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1. Introduction 
This thesis examines academic disciplinary language in a sample of research articles from the field 
of game theory. Earlier research has shown that all academic disciplines have their own set of features 
of disciplinary language use, and this thesis will focus in the use of stance markers (e. g. Hyland 
2005b). A framework from previous studies on the differences of language use in academic 
disciplines will be used to observe how the material analyzed relates to the previous results on 
disciplinary features in academic writing. Special emphasis will be given to the notion of stance, and 
stance markers will be used as the main tool in the analysis. The initial hypothesis could suggest that, 
due to the multidisciplinary nature of game theory and the material, the results might not be what is 
expected from a mathematical model. 
 The primary research question can be formulated as  
1) How is stance expressed in research articles on game theory? 
 
The secondary research questions come naturally from this framework, and can be presented as 
following: 
2) How does the use of stance in game theory relate to other academic disciplines? 
3) What sort of stance markers are there in the research articles on game theory? 
As any form of language use, language use in academic context also constructs and displays its own 
conventions and specific features which contribute to its unique linguistic culture, separating its 
language from that of for example a newspaper or a conversation. Academic discourses make a rich 
topic for research, as they are crucial to society, “a powerful cultural form in modern society, 
influencing and being influenced by societies which they are a part of” (Hyland 2000, 158). The 
linguistic differences between academic disciplines are important, as for example to those, who 
attempt to become a participating member of academic community, the mastery of academic 
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discourse and its specialist genres is vital. Previous literature has also suggested that “disciplinary 
identity may be structurally related to the specialist genres” (Dressen-Hammouda 2008, 233). 
Becher and Trowler (2001) discuss cultures within academic communities, and define 
cultures as “sets of taken-for-granted values, attitudes and ways of behaving, which are articulated 
through and reinforced by recurrent practices among a group of people in a given context” (23). 
Language use can definitely be seen as a part of these special cultures, and Becher and Trowler later 
discuss the division between academic disciplines and how “we may appropriately conceive of 
disciplines as having recognizable identities and particular cultural attributes” (44). This illustrates 
the relevance of disciplines as a culture in which the discourse is created.  
My analysis examines these differing attributes between disciplines mostly through the 
use of the linguistic expression of stance. The link between academic disciplines and disciplinary 
identity, as well as the overall significance of academic language, give importance to examining these 
differences and similarities within the academic culture. In broader terms finding and acknowledging 
differences as well as discovering common ground can be important in understanding and cooperation 
between any given cultures. 
In order to answer my research questions I will present a theoretical background on 
researching academic writing based on previous literature. More precisely I will focus on how stance 
is expressed in written academic language, and how the use of stance differs in various academic 
disciplines. I will in addition discuss game theory and why it has been chosen as the subject matter 
for my material. 
First my thesis will build a theoretical framework on game theory, research on academic 
discourse, and then I will identify and define characteristics and features of language used with 
different academic disciplines as well as their relevance to my analysis. I will discuss the chosen 
research material, which comprises academic journal articles relating to the field of game theory, and 
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then discuss the features of stance in the material and how game theory positions in terms of 
disciplinary variation in stance. 
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2. Theoretical Background 
To build a theoretical framework for my paper I will next focus on three key issues. First I will briefly 
introduce the basics of game theory and then I will discuss research on academic writing. Finally I 
will turn my attention to the issues most essential to my analysis, the expression of stance in different 
academic disciplines, what differences there are in disciplines and how they appear in written 
academic language. In the theory sections all boldface and italics in quotations are from the original 
source unless otherwise indicated. 
 
2.1. Background on Game Theory 
Although I will not employ game theory as a theoretical tool in my study, it is essential to give some 
basics of game theory to illustrate the reasons as to why the research material I have chosen is from 
this field. Game theory is developed as a “branch of applied mathematics that models situations of 
strategic interaction between several agents” (Jaeger 2008 406). In other words, game theory deals 
with interaction between these agents, human beings. At the core of game theory there is the idea that 
all actions where participants, or players, make a decision, a kind of ‘game’ is played. Game theory 
has both prescriptive and descriptive applications, and can thus be used both to “tell us how we should 
behave in a game in order to produce optimal results, or it can be seen as a theory that describes how 
agents actually behave in a game” (Benz et al. 2006, 19). 
 In game theory use of the word ‘game’ can be somewhat misleading to those unfamiliar 
with the theory, as it does not necessarily mean a game in a conventional sense like a game of cards 
or a computer game (although it certainly can refer to them, too), but rather refers to any situation 
involving an agent, or a player, making a decision with different results, or pay-offs:  
 
5 
 
 
 
“In a very general sense we can say that we play a game together with other people 
whenever we have to decide between several actions such that the decision depends on 
the choice of actions by others and on our preferences over the ultimate results.” (Benz 
et al. 2006, 1) 
 
This idea of a game being played can be seen to apply to anything, from driving a car to political 
elections, or from auctions to a union negotiating with a company (Binmore 2007, 1). All of these 
games are different in their construction, but all of them have a player or players making a decision 
with multiple options at their disposal, and the outcomes depending on these decisions. About these 
options Jaeger (2008) mentions how “Each player has choices between various ways of behaving – 
his strategies. Also, each player has ‘preferences’ over possible outcomes of the interaction” (407). 
There is a myriad of different games in game theory, including but not limited to noncooperative 
games, cooperative games, games with perfect or imperfect information, repeated games and so on 
(e. g. Ordeshook 1986). Jaeger (2008) notes that since its inception, game theory has “developed into 
a standard tool in economics” (406). 
Game theory uses terms like games, players or strategies, but as mentioned these apply 
for any situation with interaction. To give a simple constructed example of everyday game theoretical 
decision could be that I go to the university cafeteria with my friend, and would like to eat. However, 
as my friend does not have a lot of time I decide to skip lunch and enjoy a cup of coffee in good 
company instead. Here my decision also depends on another player’s decision: I would want to have 
a full meal, but since I would have to eat most of it alone, I go for the cup of coffee. In game theoretical 
terms I have played a two-player game and have strategically reached a decision, based on not only 
my own preferences but also the actions of the other player, made according to their set of preferences.  
Another classic example of applying game theory comes from Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944) when they introduce a case from The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes by Arthur 
Conan Doyle. Holmes attempts to escape his nemesis, professor Moriarty, via train to Dover but after 
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spotting Moriarty at Victoria station anticipates that Moriarty will take a faster train to catch him in 
Dover, and Holmes is left with the choice of whether to stay on board until Dover or get off at the 
only intermediate station. Von Neumann and Morgenstern point out that this example from literature 
actually introduces a case of two-player game with pay-offs determined by actions of both players. 
(176-177)  
John Von Neumann, who has a hand in the classic example above is seen as the 
“inventor” of game theory, when in 1928 he “derived the first prominent game theoretic result” (Gates 
& Humes 1997, 1-2). Game theory evolved from purely mathematical model into a tool used in 
political sciences and economics in the 1940s and 1950s (Gates & Humes, 2). Another example of a 
famous game theorist, recognized even in popular culture, is the 1994 Nobel winner John Nash 
(whose life was famously the inspiration for the Academy-award winning 2001 film, A Beautiful 
Mind, where Nash was played by Russel Crowe), who in 1950 introduced the concept of Nash 
equilibrium. Nash equilibrium is used in predicting results of games where the players know each 
other’s strategies, and make their decision based on this.  
A simplified example of Nash Equilibrium is illustrated by Binmore (2007) with the 
following example: “Alice and Bob are two middle-aged drivers approaching each other in a street 
too narrow for them to pass safely without someone slowing down (12)”. In this example the solution 
is that if Alice knows Bob will slow down to make room on the street, Alice should speed up to access 
the street, or if Alice knows Bob will speed up then it is best for Alice to slow down to avoid a 
deadlock. Of course the strategies work vice versa for Bob, too. The situation where one slows down 
and the other speeds up is Nash Equilibrium, producing a best pay-off for both Alice and Bob (after 
all, if both speed up or slow down there is an imminent collision on the narrow street!). (Binmore 14) 
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Game theory, like any other theory, obviously is a theory with nuances and complexities 
which are impossible, and not relevant to this thesis, to cover in this brief introduction. At the heart 
of game theory there is however, as previously mentioned, the idea of human interaction. Game 
theory has real-world applications, as in for example designing auctions for government-owned radio 
frequencies to be used for cellular telephones in the United States and the UK (Binmore 2007, 2-3). 
Although game theory has its roots in mathematics, I previously mentioned its use in economics but 
it is also widely used in various other academic fields, including social sciences, political science (e.g. 
Ordeshook, 1986), psychology (Jaeger 2008 406) and even linguistics (e.g. Pietarinen 2007) or 
evolutionary biology (e. g. Binmore, 2007 117).  
As has been pointed out, game theory has a strong origin in mathematics, and thus could 
initially be expected to follow the language conventions of other mathematical disciplines. However 
due to game theory’s history of undeniably multidisciplinary applications I will argue that it can 
provide a seemingly opportune field to discover language features differing from mathematics, as 
game theory lends itself effortlessly to a variety of topics and subjects across discipline boundaries. 
 
2.2. Researching academic writing  
A part of research of academic discourse falls under the study of English for specific purposes 
(referred to as the common abbreviation ESP from now on, e.g. the academic journal English for 
Specific Purposes) or more accurately for this work, English for academic purposes (commonly 
shortened EAP, as it is here from now on), that is the use of language in academic context. Zwiers 
(2014) describes some main features of academic language as “the language used to describe abstract 
concepts, complex ideas, and critical thinking” (ix). With conventional wisdom, discourse in 
academic field can be seen as objective writing aimed at distributing and building knowledge, but 
this view has drastically changed:  
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“Over the past decade or so, academic writing has gradually lost its traditional tag as an 
objective, faceless and impersonal form of discourse and come to be seen as a 
persuasive endeavor involving interaction between writers and readers.” (Hyland, 
2005b 173). 
 
Given this view it is obvious that academic writing can be examined in terms of linguistic devices, 
such as genre features, linguistic markers, vocabulary, or rhetoric tools. This part will further discuss 
the theory of research on academic writing to build a background for the analysis of language features 
and academic disciplines. 
The concept of language in academic context in itself is a vast term which includes a 
variety of types of professional sub-genres to be studied, including but not limited to research articles 
(e.g. Gross & Chesley, 2012), academic bios (e.g. Tse, 2012), textbooks (e.g. Bondi, 2012), PhD 
theses (e.g. Thompson 2012) or student essays (e.g. Matsuda & Jeffrey, 2012). Academic writing has 
been studied with focus on different aspects, ranging from for example structural patterns (Lin & 
Evans, 2012) to academic vocabulary (Hyland & Tse, 2007). It should be noted that much of the 
aforementioned examples of varieties within academic discourse only concern academic language in 
its written form. Out of the aforementioned written professional sub-genres, this thesis examines the 
language of research articles, referred to as RA from now on. 
A definition of a research article is in order to discuss it as research material for this 
thesis. Although Swales (1990) notes that “like all living genres, the RA is continually evolving” 
(110), a both thorough and brief definition of research article is given as  
“a written text (although often containing non-verbal elements), usually limited to a few 
thousand words, that reports on some investigation carried out by its author or authors. 
In addition, the RA will usually relate findings within it to those of others, and may also 
examine issues of theory and/or methodology. It is to appear or has appeared in a 
research journal or, less typically, in an edited book-length collection of papers” (93) 
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As there are a myriad of ways to categorize and examine academic language as a research subject, 
one must find the appropriate viewpoint and framework for analysis. Hyland (1999) suggests that 
“the persuasiveness of academic discourse does not depend upon the demonstration of absolute truth, 
empirical evidence or flawless logic… …[texts] are persuasive only when they employ social and 
linguistic conventions that colleagues find convincing” (99). McGrath & Kuteeva (2012) offer a 
summary of some of the ways how in academic writing the author carries out the task of presenting 
scientific knowledge through the writing, but also has a position to leave a personal stamp on the 
language, as they note that a research article author in academic writing:  
[the writer] “…does indeed inform readers of the facts or processes leading to a 
scientific discovery, he or she also conveys an attitude towards the reliability or 
potential impact of the result, and its position in the existing canon. Furthermore, the 
author seeks to guide the reader through the material and micro-manages their 
interpretations, anticipating possible objections and highlighting key features” (162-
163). 
 
It is in this context of the writer’s attitudes where disciplinary differences relevant to this thesis can 
be found. Ramanathan and Atkinson (1999) recognize “that which individuates a writer from all other 
writers, as evidenced in that writer’s texts” (49) with the term of voice. Although looking at voice in 
academic articles is at first problematic as it has “often literary and aesthetic overtones” (Tardy 2012 
34) and “for decades the study of voice has been the privileged domain of literary criticism” (Silver 
2012 202), the term is not out of place with academic writing either.  
Voice concerns academic disciplines, too, as “whereas ‘individual voice’ may be 
thought of as the property of a writer, ‘social voice’ is associated more with the disciplinary or other 
social groups to which the writing and the writer are linked” (2012, 37). Acknowledging the term of 
voice as the indicator of differentiating writers from each other, there is another term which I will 
employ in my analysis, stance, as “stance is subsumed in the broader phenomenon of voice” (Sancho 
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Guinda & Hyland, 2012 4) and will provide me with focus and devices needed for the theoretical 
background, method and analysis. 
 
2.3. Stance and academic writing 
To discover the disciplinary characteristics of RA writing in game theory my thesis will employ the 
term stance. What stance is and what it entails are discussed in this chapter. Gray and Biber (2012) 
describe stance as a concept about “the ways in which speakers and writers encode opinions and 
assessments in the language they produce,” concerning personal feelings and attitudes as well as 
certainty and doubt in relation to knowledge (15). Stance, much the same as voice, can be applied 
just the same to spoken and written English as well as fiction and factual writing. There has been 
several definitions and descriptions of what stance entails, depending on the point of view, but in this 
chapter the aspects of stance most relevant to my method and analysis will be introduced: first the 
definition of stance and then I will discuss its composition of devices related both to the knowledge 
communicated as well as personal feelings and attitudes. 
 
2.3.1. Defining stance 
Hyland draws attention to academic language as a “persuasive endeavor involving interaction 
between writers and readers” (2005b, 173), highlighting the argumentative nature of it. This shows 
how argumentation and rhetoric are essential when discussing stance. Harking back to Aristotle the 
earliest definitions of rhetoric define three main components: pathos, ethos and logos, and all of them 
concern the speaker’s (and indeed, the author’s) different ways of affecting the audience.  
Pathos is associated with conveying emotions and appealing to the emotions of the 
audience (Cockcroft& Cockcroft, 1992 9). Ethos is defined as persuasion through personality and 
stance (Cockcroft & Cockcroft 8), “the speaker’s stance of sincere and confident authority” (Nash, 
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1989 207) and “ways in which the perceived attributes of a speaker, manifest through discourse, are 
persuasive” (Jasinski 2001 229). Logos, on the other hand is persuasion through reasoning and 
rational argument (Jasinski 350).  
Although there are several other, more modern methods of classifying rhetorical 
discourse, the Aristotelian model alone illustrates that all forms of rhetoric can be expressed through 
stance, as stance is closely related to both knowledge and emotions in the text, and in fact these two 
can often be easily intertwined. More specifically knowledge and emotions in stance are expressed 
through evidentiality and affect, both of which will be discussed later on. Although this thesis does 
not discuss rhetoric per se, it is useful to point out the close relationship of these concepts. 
Overall stance has been discussed by Biber et al. (1999) as the position a writer or a 
speaker takes on several issues in the text: “In addition to communicating propositional content, 
speakers and writers commonly express personal feelings, attitudes, value judgments, or assessments; 
that is, they express a ‘stance’” (966). Biber et al. suggest that stance in a text can be “expressed in 
many ways, including grammatical devices, word choice and paralinguistic devices” (966), with 
the focus of this thesis being exclusively on the grammatical expression of stance due to paralinguistic 
devices relating mostly to speakers in a conversation and fictional writing (Biber et al. 967-968).  
Research has been conducted on stance in academic context, for example this definition 
of stance as “an attitudinal dimension and includes features which refer to the ways writers present 
themselves and convey their judgements, opinions, and commitments. It is the ways that writers 
intrude to stamp their personal authority onto their arguments or step back and disguise their 
involvement.” (Hyland 2005b, 176). Given the attitudinal dimension of stance it should be noted that 
a connection between stance and the definition of culture is evident, as culture concerns shared 
attitudes (Becher & Trowler 2001, 23). In academic writing “the writer’s stance is at least partially 
influenced by the social practices of his or her academic discipline” (Hyland 1999. 99). 
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Stance has often been employed in research of academic language, as Biber (2006) 
points out how this seems to contradict the conventional notion of objectivity in academic language 
as “according to one idealized representation of university language, there would be no need for 
stance expressions” (87). In addition Biber notes how “in some cases speakers and writers in 
university registers seem more concerned with the expression of stance than with the communication 
of ‘facts’.” (87). When comparing English registers of conversational, academic, fictional and news 
language use Biber et al. (1999) note that stance markers are common in all the registers, and “it is 
more surprising that stance markers are prevalent in academic writing, especially given the general 
lack of first person involvement in that register” (980).The uses of stance in academic writing and 
their connection to academic disciplines and their own language conventions will be discussed later 
on, but first I will discuss components which construct stance. 
 
2.3.2. Constructing stance: evidentiality and affect 
The discussion above suggests how the perceived ‘objectiveness’, or at the very least the ideal of 
objectiveness of academic language, is perhaps more problematic than one could assume, and thus 
also a subject worth examining. However there is a fundamental task which academic language 
carries out, as for example Hyland (2000) argues that “to a large extent disciplinary discourse has 
evolved as a means of funding, constructing, evaluating, displaying and negotiating knowledge” (5). 
As stance is used to describe the writer’s attitudes, using stance in analyzing academic language 
becomes relevant when examining these attitudes of the writer towards the knowledge being 
communicated. The following part discusses what the term stance entails with focus on the notions 
of evidentiality and affect. There are other definitions of stance, as for example the inclusion of 
relation (e.g. Hyland 1999), or the label evaluation (e. g. Hunston & Thompson, 2000) but for the 
purposes of this work I will focus on evidentiality and affect. 
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To further discuss stance and knowledge in academic writing Biber (2006) draws 
attention to the function of academic registers and their task of assessing information (87). Hyland 
(2000) also notes how academic texts can “work to transform research findings or armchair 
reflections into academic knowledge” (7) and attempt to persuade a reader “to accept a particular 
observation as a fact, or at least as a worthwhile contribution to disciplinary knowledge” (8). 
Especially as there is “always more than one plausible interpretation of a given piece of data, the 
reader may be persuaded to judge a claim as acceptable, or may decide to reject it” (Hyland 1999, 
103). The attempt to construct or assess knowledge relates strongly to the ways the writer expresses 
in the text their own attitude towards knowledge, and this status of knowledge in a given proposition 
is known as evidentiality (Gray & Biber, 2012 16) or epistemic stance (Biber et al. 1999 972). 
Evidentiality in a text “functions in the representation of epistemological stance - the 
underlying perspective on knowledge represented in a text” (Barton 1993, 746). Evidentiality in a 
text is expressed through evidential devices, which in many non-Indo-European languages are 
represented through specific grammatical constructions (Barton 746), but in English are expressed 
through devices such as “modal auxiliaries, adverbs, and miscellaneous idiomatic phrases” (Chafe, 
1986, 261). Chafe also discusses evidentiality and academic language, giving an overview of 
academic written language and evidentiality in comparison with conversational English:  
“…in general, conversational English and academic writing both show a concern for 
the reliability of knowledge, as well as induction. Academic writing shows more 
concern for deduction, neither makes a big point of marking the kind of evidence per 
se, and hedging as well as other devices which match knowledge against expectations 
are more characteristic of conversation than of academic written language.” (272) 
Biber et al. also note the variety of ways epistemic stance can present the writer’s attitudes about 
information: epistemic stance markers “can mark certainty (or doubt), actuality, precision, or 
limitation; or they can indicate the source of knowledge or the perspective from which the information 
is given” (972). What stance markers are and how they manifest in a text will be discussed later, but 
an important note on the epistemic stance and academic writing is the indication of the source of 
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knowledge through quotations and citations, which is essential in any given text that attempts to be 
considered academic. 
Compared to evidentiality the notion of affect moves more towards the realm of 
emotions and attitudes: Hyland (2005b) discusses affect as part of stance, and states that affect 
“involves a broad range of personal and professional attitudes towards what is said, including 
emotions, perspectives and beliefs” (178). Affective factors refer to “overt expressions of a range of 
personal feelings and dispositions” (Hyland 1999 102). Biber et al. discuss attitudinal stance (974) 
which seems to cover the notion of affect the same way epistemic stance relates to evidentiality, as 
attitudinal stance markers “report personal attitudes or feelings” (974).  
It should be noted that for example Biber et al. (1999) note how “the meaning of a stance 
marker can be ambiguous in some cases” and gives an example clause: 
“I hope there’s enough there” 
Here the verb hope “conveys both a personal attitude and an epistemic stance (lack of certainty)” 
(972). This ambiguity can be dealt with by not making a separation between evidentiality and affect 
when discussing stance: Gray & Biber (2012) mention that evidentiality and affect are both often 
brought together into the model of stance, as stance actually covers both “personal attitudes and 
emotions as well as assessments of status of knowledge” (17). My analysis will consider this semantic 
difference of expressing evidentiality or affect mainly in classifying the elements of stance for the 
theoretical framework, but also utilize both of them in building the definition for the term stance, and 
illustrating the various issues which stance communicates in academic writing. 
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2.3.3. Marking of stance in academic writing 
What stance is and how it is constructed is needed to focus on the specific ways in how stance is 
expressed, as there are several ways how stance is marked in writing. Biber et al. (1999) discuss the 
grammatical construction of stance and identify some major linguistic components which express 
stance in writing, including stance adverbials, stance complement clauses, modals and semi-modals, 
with stance adverbials and complement clause constructions recognized as the clearest cases of 
marking stance (969-970).  
Grammatical marking of stance is a very wide topic, but there has been models of 
classifying and recognizing stance markers in academic language, which can offer mode focus on 
stance and academic disciplines, e.g. Hyland (1999). This thesis will examine stance from the 
standpoint of a corpus-based study on stance and engagement in RA writing by Ken Hyland (2005b). 
The study is based on an analysis of 240 published research articles from eight disciplines (173). 
Although the approach from a single corpus-based study can be considered a formidable limitation 
on stance, as for example Sancho Guinda & Hyland (2012) point out (4), and there obviously can be 
some overlap between the categories as forms can often perform more than one function at once. 
However for the purposes of this work this classification provides focus and offers a sufficient 
framework for identifying the elements of stance in a text. Hyland (2005b) recognizes four major 
markings of stance: hedges, boosters, attitude markers and self-mentions (178). 
 
2.3.3.1. Hedges and boosters 
Hedges mentioned by Hyland (2005b) are “devices like possible, might and perhaps, that indicate the 
writer’s decision to withhold complete commitment to a proposition, allowing information to be 
presented as an opinion rather than accredited fact” [italics from original] (178). Boosters on the other 
hand are defined by Hyland as “words like clearly, obviously and demonstrate, which allow writers 
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to express their certainty in what they say and to mark involvement with the topic and solidarity with 
their audience” (179). Hedges and boosters can also be defined as “communicative strategies for 
increasing or reducing the force of a statement” (Hyland 2000, 87). In terms of semantic distinction 
both hedges and boosters are regarded as part of epistemic stance as epistemic stance, according to 
Biber et al. (1999) can mark both certainty or doubt (972). 
There are certain strategic tasks which both hedges and boosters can be seen to have in 
writing. Hyland (2009) notes that with hedges and boosters “both strategies emphasize that statements 
don’t just communicate ideas, but also the writer’s attitude to them and to readers” (75). Their rhetoric 
nature and strategic usage should also be noted, as both of these stance markers “work to balance 
objective information, subjective evaluation and interpersonal negotiation, and this can be a 
powerfully persuasive factor in gaining acceptance for claims” (Hyland 2000, 101).  
Hyland states that hedges in academic writing are used to reduce the force of statement 
to distinguish certainty from opinion and allow reader to dispute their interpretations and leave 
“agreement open to readers’ judgements” (94): after all, in academic writing the knowledge is 
presented in statements which are “evaluated and interpreted through the prism of disciplinary 
assumptions” (92). Boosters on the other hand are used to enforce the statement of the writer: this is 
acknowledged by Hyland as a bit contradictory to hedges and their cautious nature, but note that 
boosters serve the purpose of balancing this caution “by a degree of assertion and self-involvement” 
(97). Both hedges and boosters in writing are of course not independent of individual factors such as 
self-confidence and experience, but as Hyland also points out, “all acts of communication carry the 
imprint of their contexts” (91) and thus there are discourse conventions which are followed in RA 
writing by the use of stance markers such as hedges and boosters.  
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2.3.3.2. Attitude markers 
The difference between the epistemic and attitudinal stance is, as mentioned before, mostly semantic 
rather than grammatical. For the marking of an affective attitude in a text Hyland (2005b) uses the 
term attitude marker “conveying surprise, agreement, importance, frustration, and so on, rather than 
commitment”, and that these are mostly “signaled by attitude verbs (e.g. agree, prefer), sentence 
adverbs (unfortunately, hopefully), and adjectives (appropriate, logical, remarkable)” (180). Biber et 
al. (1999) categorize these devices as signaling attitudinal stance, which marks attitudes, evaluations 
and personal feelings or emotions in the text (974). Hyland (2009) notes academic disciplines in 
relation to attitude markers as “this marking of attitude in academic writing allows writers both take 
a stand and align themselves with disciplinary-oriented value positions” (76). 
 
2.3.3.3. Self-mentions 
The fourth element marking stance used in Hyland’s (2005b) study, self-mentions, relates to “the use 
of first person pronouns and possessive adjectives” to present information (181). Hyland (2009) states 
that with self-mentions “the presence or absence of explicit author reference is therefore a conscious 
choice by writers to adopt a particular stance and disciplinary-situated authorial identity” (76). As 
academic register favors the more objective and non-personal use of language, self-mentions can 
actually bring an explicit self of the writer into the text, and these instances position the writer directly 
with the information presented. 
Although stance, along with voice, can often be connected with studying individual 
writers, for my study I will look at some general features characteristic to various academic 
disciplines. Given how stance is strongly associated with the individual and their attitudes I will next 
introduce theoretical background on how stance markers have been used to analyze entire academic 
disciplines and more importantly how I will differentiate between disciplines and use this in my 
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analysis of the RA material and what I will attempt to find. The four elements of stance introduced 
in Hyland’s study provide a sound framework for mapping stance markers in academic writing and 
associating them with different academic disciplines. 
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3. Differences in disciplinary discourses 
Variation in academic discourse can be approached from several angles, for example using different 
academic genres of writing, focusing on differences between language use of students and seasoned 
academics (e.g. Barton 1993) or examining the structures of research articles (e.g. Lin & Evans 2011). 
This chapter will address the previously discussed theoretical framework on academic language, 
mostly the concept of stance, and will use this background in relation to different academic 
disciplines. Main focus will be on these disciplines and how they differ from each other in terms of 
language features, especially stance. 
To study academic writing in RA literature with focus on academic disciplinary 
discourse it is essential to define and identify the differences in language use among various 
disciplines. Finding a framework of disciplinary academic writing is challenging, as disciplinary 
conventions in academic writing are “both subtle and complex, offering a guiding framework for 
writers” and do not consist of explicit rules (Hyland 2000, 145). It should be noted that making 
assumptions about very strict discipline boundaries should be discouraged, as Becher & Trowler 
(2001) note how a branch of a discipline can separate from the “parent discipline”, e.g. in the case of 
statistics and mathematics, (41) and also how organizational structures of universities and 
international community “with its own professional associations and specialist journals” (41) play a 
role in defining various academic disciplines. With these issues acknowledged it is still possible to 
find differences between the language uses of different academic disciplines and show their relevance 
to my analysis.  
Approach, subject matter and methodology can obviously differ in academic 
disciplines, but there are other methods of differentiating between them. Hyland & Tse (2007) have 
employed a corpus study for differences in academic vocabulary, and notice that their results “reveals 
uneven word frequencies, restricted item range, disciplinary preferences for particular items over 
semantic equivalents, and additional meanings lent to items by disciplinary convention and 
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associations in lexical bundles” (248).  Becher & Trowler (2001) draw a distinction between ‘hard’ 
sciences and ‘soft’ fields in terms of knowledge construction, where in the first knowledge is built on 
the previous work of others, and in the latter the views of others are presented for the writer to take a 
positon in relation to them (36).  
 
3.1. Disciplines and stance 
The corpus-based study by Ken Hyland on stance and engagement in academic research articles 
(2005b) is the main basis for differentiating academic disciplines in terms of stance. As Hyland’s 
study included eight disciplines: “mechanical engineering (ME), electrical engineering (EE), 
marketing (Mk), philosophy (Phil), sociology (Soc), applied linguistics (AL), physics (Phy) and 
microbiology (Bio)” (178). McGrath & Kuteeva (2011) later followed similar approach and method 
on 25 published articles from the field of pure mathematics (P Mth) (163). The inclusion of pure 
mathematics is to McGrath & Kuteeva important, as although they state that “pure mathematics does 
share common ground with the hard sciences” it also has a notable differences and uniqueness in that 
the process of knowledge verification differs since in mathematics “the results are substantiated by 
logical, mathematical reasoning” and the outcome is “essentially limited to a binary true or false 
(162). With McGrath & Kuteeva’s and Hyland’s studies there are a total of nine different disciplines 
with various stance markers mapped. 
Hyland’s results suggest that overall, stance items occurred 30.9 times per 1,000 words, 
with hedges being the most common one with 14.5 per 1,000 words compared to attitude markers 
(6.4), boosters (5.8) and self-mentions (4.2) (86). Hyland points out that the overall frequency of 
stance markers is greater per 1,000 words than that of for example passive voice constructions or past 
tense verbs, illustrating the prevalence of stance in academic RA writing (186). It should be noted 
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that the previous numbers about the overall frequency does not include the McGrath & Kuteeva 
findings of pure mathematics, as it used different corpus material. 
Table 1. Stance features by discipline (per 1,000 words) 
Feature P Mth Phy Bio ME EE Phil Soc AL Mk 
Stance 10,7 25.0 23.8 19.8 21.6 42.8 31.1 37.2 39.5 
Hedges 1.8 9.6 13.6 8.2 9.6 18.5 14.7 18.0 20.0 
Boosters 5.4 6.0 3.9 5.0 3.2 9.7 5.1 6.2 7.1 
Attitude markers 2.7 3.9 2.9 5.6 5.5 8.9 7.0 8.6 6.9 
Self-mentions 0.8 5.5 3.4 1.0 3.3 5.7 4.3 4.4 5.5 
 
Table 1 illustrates the number of stance markers per thousand words. The author has combined results 
from both Hyland and McGrath & Kuteeva studies in the same table. As can be seen, there is clearly 
variation in the frequency of the stance markers by discipline. Overall pure mathematics (P Mth), 
mechanical engineering (ME) and electrical engineering (EE) display the smallest number of stance 
marker occurrences, while philosophy (Phil), marketing (Mk) and applied linguistics (AL) have the 
most stance marker occurrences. In fact the difference between pure mathematics and philosophy is 
a formidable one, 10.7 to 42.8. With 10.7 P Mth displayed clearly the least stance markers, as even 
ME and EE had 19.8 and 21.6, respectively. Hyland attributes the variation on the nature of the ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ disciplines, as “those in the humanities and social sciences taking far more explicitly 
involved and personal positions than those in the science and engineering fields” (187). This would 
explain the higher number of stance markers, as they communicate the writer’s attitudes towards the 
information, and also the ‘softer’ fields allow more communication of personal positions.  
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3.1.1. Hedges and disciplines 
In Hyland’s study hedges (e.g. could, might, suggests) were by far the most common stance marker 
in all of the disciplines, as illustrated by Table 1. The frequency of hedges in comparison between 
disciplines also followed the pattern of sciences and engineering displaying less hedges than the 
‘softer’ fields. McGrath & Kuteeva’s results with P Mth however considerably deviated from this, as 
hedges were in fact not even the second most common stance marker, with only 1.8 occurrences. In 
comparison, even the engineering data showed a frequency of 8.2 (ME) and 9.6 (EE). McGrath & 
Kuteeva note that the small number of hedges in P Mth “was expected” (170) and attribute it to “the 
high level of conviction demanded of a truth-based discipline and the complexity of the subject 
matter” (171). Hyland (2005b) discusses hedges and disciplinary differences in building knowledge, 
and notes that “while writers in all disciplines used hedges in the evaluation of their statements, they 
were considerably more frequent in the soft disciplines, perhaps indicating less assurance about what 
colleagues could be safely assumed to accept” (188).  
 
3.1.2. Boosters and disciplines 
Table 1 indicates that boosters (e.g. clearly, obviously) were with most disciplines the second most 
common stance marker, with P Mth being the notable exception with boosters: in P Mth boosters 
were the most common stance marker, and actually more common than all the other stance markers 
combined (5.4 for boosters compared to the total of 5.3 with the three other stance markers). For EE, 
boosters were the least common stance marker, which is somewhat interesting as it was the only 
discipline where this is the case. The other engineering discipline, ME also had a relatively small 
number of boosters as they were less common than both hedges and attitude markers. 
 
23 
 
 
 
With boosters it can be seen that the division of hard vs soft disciplines might not be 
clear-cut with all the individual stance items. Although general occurrence of stance markers can be 
seen to illustrate the ‘hard-soft’ division, each discipline still have their own individual profile of 
stance markers. 
 
3.1.3. Attitude markers and disciplines 
Attitude markers (e.g. agree, unfortunately, remarkable) in the data also support the hard/ soft 
division of disciplines, as they were most common in philosophy and applied linguistics at 8.9 and 
8.6 respectively. Physics, biology and pure mathematics all showed a relatively low number of 
attitude markers, ranging from 2.7 to 3.9, less than half of philosophy or applied linguistics. Both 
engineering disciplines positioned somewhere in between with 5.6 (ME) and 5.5 (EE).  
 
3.1.4. Self-mentions and disciplines 
Self-mentions (e.g. in my opinion, we think that) generally appear to be the least common stance item 
across disciplines, which is understandable as academic language generally can be seen to encourage 
more passive voice in writing. There seems to be some variation in the frequency of the most versus 
least self-mentions from 0.8 (P Mth) to 5.7 (Phil). Perhaps surprisingly physics (Phy), philosophy 
(Phi) and marketing (Mk) have the most self-mentions. The fact that physics might be considered a 
‘hard’ discipline and philosophy on the softer side makes it interesting, especially as other hard 
sciences, P Mth, EE and ME have very little occurrences of self-mention. 
 The difference in the use of self-mentions and disciplines is explained by Hyland 
(2005b) to possibly be due to strategic differences. Hyland suggests that “in the sciences it is common 
for writers to downplay their personal role to highlight the phenomena under study, the replicability 
of research activities, and the generality of the findings” and in the softer disciplines the use of first 
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person relates to “the desire to both strongly identify oneself with a particular argument and to gain 
credit for an individual perspective” (181). 
Overall Hyland and McGarth & Kuteeva’s results support the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ division 
of disciplines. Other studies too have shown “a clear correlation of with the traditional distinction 
between hard and soft disciplines, broadly corresponding to the sciences and humanities/ social 
sciences” suggesting that “the sciences tend to produce more impersonal texts” (Hyland 1999, 109).  
In a previous study Hyland (1999) sees a possible explanation to this in both the purpose 
of the sciences and the code of communication. Whereas natural scientists “often convey meaning in 
a highly compressed code impenetrable to the uninitiated” and “see their goal as producing public 
knowledge able to withstand the rigours of falsifiability” (109), with the humanities and social 
sciences the ‘code’ of communication is more simple as knowledge-making “despite the use of 
technical terminology, is often accomplished in apparently everyday terms” and they produce 
“interpretative discourses which often recast knowledge as sympathetic understanding” (109). 
Although P Math displays the smallest number of stance marker occurrences, McGrath 
& Kuteeva consider surprising especially “the presence of attitude markers and boosting devices, 
further debunking the myth that mathematical discourse is purely objective, and conveyed by 
standardized code” (170). This is somewhat in contrast to Hyland’s notion of the rigorous ‘code’ of 
natural sciences, but both are not mutually exclusive, as it is reasonable to assume that the disciplinary 
cultures of hard and soft sciences contribute to disciplinary differences in stance markers, but also 
even the most theoretical discipline such as pure mathematics are not exempt from stance markers. 
 
3.2. Issues and Problems 
Stance is a wide and complex topic, and the fact that there are various ways to define it poses the 
problem of selecting which definition to use. I discussed the definition of stance relevant to this paper, 
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but since there are more than one term involved (e. g. evidentiality, affect, evaluation), it is 
problematic to compare the different definitions. This ambiguity alone can cause some dissonance in 
understanding and interpreting stance. 
The framework for the methodology will be used as in Hyland (2005b) and McGrath & 
Kuteeva (2012). This poses some problems, as the division of stance markers in Hyland has a 
semantic rather than a clear grammatical basis, but as for example Biber et al. mention that “the 
meaning of a stance marker can be ambiguous in some cases” (972) and it is not uncommon for them 
to have more than one role. For these reasons assigning stance markers in their proper category is 
done on an individual basis, depending on the context of use rather than the actual structure. 
There are other methods of categorizing stance, as for example Gray, Biber & Hiltunen 
(2011) use a more lexico-grammatical method, constructing stance by “modal and semi-modal verbs, 
adverbials and that-complement clauses controlled by stance nouns, verbs and adjectives” (222-223). 
They categorize stance markers according to for example attitudinal, certainty and likelihood. (256). 
A method such as which Gray, Biber & Hiltunen use offers a detailed basis to identify stance markers, 
that differs from the division to hedges, boosters, attitude markers and self-mentions. I have addressed 
this by introducing the grammatical features of stance in my discussion on theory, but this issue 
cannot be fully resolved since my analysis will use the categorization introduced by Hyland. This will 
however offer the benefit of having a background of the previous results and utilizing these results in 
the analysis of Game Theory in relation to other disciplines. 
Gray, Biber & Hiltunen utilize an extensive list of forms used in their analysis of stance, 
and this list was used as a starting point, alongside a list of hedges, boosters, self-mentions and attitude 
markers used by Hyland in the Appendix for Metadiscourse (2005a, 220-224). The forms in the list 
by Gray, Biber & Hiltunen are however classified in accordance to division of hedges, boosters, 
attitude markers and self-mentions which Hyland uses. All of their stance markers were not counted, 
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as their analysis is are gathered from material from late 1700s to early 1800s, and are somewhat 
archaic and irrelevant to modern day academic English i.e. frighten’d, odde. The complete list of 
forms used and their division is presented in Appendix 1.  
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4. The material 
For the material for my thesis, RA literature from the field of game theory has been selected from the 
peer-reviewed academic journal International Journal of Game Theory. Total of 11 articles published 
between 1998 and 2013 have been selected based on the subject keywords associated to them. In 
order to discover material suited to finding various disciplinary discourse features, the most common 
keywords found in the journal’s archive such as mathematical, mathematical analysis, mathematics, 
game theory, or game theoretical concepts such as Nash equilibrium, rational choice theory etc. were 
intentionally avoided to a degree when selecting the material for the analysis. Instead subject words 
relating to various other disciplines such as robotics, friendship, semantics (philosophy) or 
lexicography were favored to ensure material with at least superficially more varied subject matter, 
and thus perhaps more likely possibilities for providing instances of different disciplinary language 
features in the material.  
It should be noted that the selection process has not, however, strictly disregarded 
conventional game theoretical topics to enable more variety in the material. Ultimately the selection 
of the material was done through the author’s consideration and judgment. As the sample collected 
is quite small, the bulk of the analysis will consider the context of the stance markers and not only 
the quantitative data. Some quantitative results are discussed to place the results obtained to the 
framework of results from Hyland (2005b) and McGrath & Kuteeva (2011) on stance markers in 
different academic discourse. 
I utilize the theoretical framework for the stance markers with the classification of 
hedges, boosters, attitude markers and self-mentions used by Hyland (2005b). To come up with 
specific stance markers, I have used as a starting point the extensive list of stance markers used by 
Hyland (2005a) and added to the list those used in Gray, Biber & Hiltunen (2011, p. 255), and divided 
the stance markers into the four categories used by Hyland. For the complete list of stance markers 
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used, see Appendix A. The data sample of 11 RAs contain 99 990 words, varying between 3,786 and 
13,418 words per article.  
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5. Results and Discussion 
 The results are discussed and compared in the context of the previous results of stance 
markers in different academic fields from Hyland (2005b) and McGrath & Kuteeva (2011). The 
author has calculated the mean values for the number of stance markers per 1,000 words, and the 
share of the four categories out of the total number of stance markers as percentages. The results have 
been added to the overall results to include these means to discussion. First the overall number of 
stance markers and the share of different stance markers of this total are discussed, and then selected 
instances of the stance markers from the material are examined further, using examples from the 
material. This helps to highlight not only the individual markers but also the context of the stance 
markers in the RAs.  
  The results in Table 2 illustrate the number of stance markers found in the material 
alongside the results of previous studies (Hyland 2005b, McGrath & Kuteeva 2011). The results are 
listed as instances per 1,000 words, rounded out to match the results from previous studies; the 
average (AVG) for all the disciplines is also counted and rounded out to .1 decimal. The total number 
of stance markers in game theory is 4.7 per 1,000 words. The largest number of stance markers is 
found in the category of boosters with 2.2, and lowest in attitude markers with 0.6. 
 Table 2. Stance features by discipline (per 1,000 words)  
Feature G Th P Mth Phy Bio ME EE Phil Soc AL Mk AVG 
Stance 4.7 10.7 25.0 23.8 19.8 21.6 42.8 31.1 37.2 39.5 25.6 
Hedges 1.1 1.8 9.6 13.6 8.2 9.6 18.5 14.7 18.0 20.0 11.5 
Boosters 2.2 5.4 6.0 3.9 5.0 3.2 9.7 5.1 6.2 7.1 5.4 
Attitude markers 0.6 2.7 3.9 2.9 5.6 5.5 8.9 7.0 8.6 6.9 5.3 
Self-mentions 0.8 0.8 5.5 3.4 1.0 3.3 5.7 4.3 4.4 5.5 3.5 
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As previously pointed out, when making conclusions on the results the small sample size must be 
considered, and discussion on absolute numbers is fundamentally problematic as the data is different 
in every case. It is however feasible to look at some tendencies from the results. The overall low 
number of stance markers in game theory can be seen to resemble the natural sciences and 
mathematics more than the social sciences and humanities, as in social sciences and humanities the 
number of stance markers is invariably over 30 per 1,000 words. The overall number of stance 
markers in game theory is considerably lower than the previous low of 10.7 in pure mathematics. In 
fact, game theory has the lowest number in every category except for self-mentions where it is tied 
with pure mathematics.  
Although the number of stance markers in game theory is in every category well below 
the average, this is expected as the total numbers are much lower than in other disciplines. This can 
well be the result of the small sample size used in the analysis, so one should be very cautious in 
making any conclusions about this. It should be noted that game theory resembles pure mathematics 
in this regard as pure mathematics also has numbers below the total averages, with the exception of 
boosters. There are also other individual instances in disciplines where the number of stance markers 
is below total average, so the results on game theory are not a complete anomaly in this sense (e.g. 
boosters and sociology, hedges and mechanical engineering). 
Pure mathematics and game theory have in common the fact that the number of boosters 
is substantially larger than number of hedges, when with the other disciplines hedges are more 
common. The number of hedges and self-mentions in game theory are also close to the values from 
pure mathematics, even in absolute numbers (i.e. in G Th 1.1 and 0.8; and P Mth 1.8 and 0.8). Given 
that game theory is essentially a mathematical model this result is not surprising. Out of all the stance 
markers in game theory attitude markers have the lowest share. This is not unique as attitude markers 
also have the lowest share of stance markers in biology and physics, although the absolute numbers 
are lower in game theory. To enable some discussion on the distribution of the stance markers, in 
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Table 3 the share of every stance marker from the total number is shown as percentages, alongside 
with the mean, or average, of all the disciplines included (AVG). The percentages are rounded out to 
.1 decimal. 
 Table 3. The share of stance features from the total number, in percentages (%)  
Feature G Th P Mth Phy Bio ME EE Phil Soc AL Mk AVG  
Hedges 23.4 16.8 38.4 57.1 41.41 44.4 43.2 47.3 48.4 50.6 41.1 
Boosters 46.8 50.5 24.0 16.4 25.3 14.8 22.7 16.4 16.7 18.0 25.2 
Attitude markers 12.8 25.2 15.6 12.2 28.3 25.5 20.8 22.5 23.1 17.5 20.4 
Self-mentions 17.0 7.5 22.0 14.3 5.1 15.3 13.3 13.8 11.8 13.9 13.4 
 
In game theory the absolute number of attitude markers is considerably lower than in other 
disciplines, but their share of the total number is not exceptional, with 12.8 %. It is still a second 
lowest share, with only biology having a marginally smaller share (12.2%). Game theory, biology, 
physics and marketing all have their share of attitude markers below the average of all the disciplines 
(20.4%). The share of hedges in stance markers found in game theory is also considerably lower than 
the total average of all the disciplines (23.4% compared to 41.1%), but with self-mentions and 
boosters game theory has percentages actually above the average. 
In terms of hedges and boosters the similarity between game theory and pure 
mathematics is again noticeable. As with other disciplines hedges form almost half of all the stance 
markers and the share of boosters vary from less than 15% to a little over a quarter, in pure 
mathematics and game theory it is the other way around. This suggests that mathematics differ not 
only from humanities and social sciences, but also from natural sciences in terms of the distribution 
of the found stance markers in RAs. 
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With attitude markers and self-mentions game theory resembles physics and biology, 
as they also have a larger share of self-mentions than attitude markers, and both are around the 15% 
share of the total number of stance markers. This can be seen to suggest that although game theory is 
a mathematical model, it has similarities with natural sciences instead of only pure mathematics, as 
pure mathematics has larger share of attitude markers, and very small that of self-mentions.  
Based on the selected RA material, in game theory the total number of stance markers 
is lower than in other disciplines. Out of the previous results on different disciplines game theory has 
similarities to pure mathematics (low overall number of stance markers, share of hedges versus the 
share of boosters), but in some respect game theory also has similarities with the natural sciences 
more than pure mathematics (low share of attitude markers and high share of self-mentions in the 
found stance markers). Overall the results seem to suggest that there are not only differences between 
the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ sciences, but that mathematics differ from the natural sciences as well, as game 
theory and pure mathematics differ from for example biology and physics especially with the total 
number of stance markers. The share of hedges and boosters of the total is also different from natural 
sciences, whereas social sciences and humanities do not differ from the natural sciences in this regard. 
As quantitative analysis is not the main component of this thesis, next section will 
highlight the stance markers found in the material, discussing hedges, boosters, attitude markers and 
self-mentions. Some patterns are discussed but only in qualitative manner to show the context of their 
use. Previous studies do not discuss these so in regard to the patterns comparison between disciplines 
is not possible in the same way as with the number of stance markers. It should be noted that examples 
of several authors are often used to show that the cases might not be merely stylistic choices of 
individual authors, but were found in the works of different writers, published in different years or 
decades. It should be noted that in the following sections, all italics in the numbered examples are 
added to highlight the word item expressing stance, unless stated otherwise. 
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5.1. Hedges in Game Theory 
When analyzing any of the stance markers in the RA material, one must note that as stance markers 
can depend on the context not all cases of the found word items are used as hedges/stance markers, 
as for example:  
(1) “We constructed an experimental design around these hypotheses…” (Bolton et al. 
1998 271)  
 
(2) “We will now come around to collect the consent forms…” (Bolton et al. 297) 
In (1) and (2) the word around is not used to mark stance of approximation, but as a preposition. In 
Bolton et al. alone there were 10 instances of the word around, but none of them were used as hedges. 
Despite this, the context can easily tell when a word item is used as a hedge, such as in (3), as in this 
case about is used to present approximation rather than a preposition.  
(3) “The proportion in 1Game-6Card is about 15% (4 out of 27)” (Bolton et al. 281). 
An analysis on the context is thus of importance in discussion on stance. Previous studies did not 
specify the tools used to differentiate these cases of the same word item either marking stance or 
something else, but it is not essential in the discussion on the results obtained, as the background is 
used mainly as a reference point but the closer analysis on the stance markers does not require 
comparison of individual instances in other disciplines.  
The total number of hedges varied from 24 to 224 per article, and in total 1,070 instances 
of hedges were found in the RA material. This gives the number of found hedges per 1,000 words as 
1.07 or 1.1 when rounded up the same as in Hyland (2005b) and McGrath & Kuteeva (2011). This 
would place game theory in the same numbers of hedges as pure mathematics (1.8), which comes as 
no surprise considering game theory as a mathematical model. Table 4 shows hedges found in the 
game theory (GTh) data, in relation to other disciplines. 
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 Table 4. Hedges by discipline   
Feature GTh P Mth Phy Bio ME EE Phil Soc AL Mk AVG 
Hedges (per 1,000 words) 1.1 1.8 9.6 13.6 8.2 9.6 18.5 14.7 18.0 20.0 11.5 
% of stance markers 23.4 16.8 38.4 57.1 41.41 44.4 43.2 47.3 48.4 50.6 41.1 
 
Overall, there are some patterns to be found in the hedges in the RA material. The mathematical 
context has a clear effect on the hedges used. There was also a tendency to separate the hedges from 
the actual text, clustering of the hedges, and hedging previous work of other academic work instead 
of the writers’ own claims. The following examples are not meant to list every occurrence of the 
hedges in the data, but to present a sample of the patterns in their original context. 
 
5.1.1. Hedges and patterns: mathematics 
Many of the hedges seem to indeed be connected to the context of mathematics, as they work together 
with mathematical elements in the text, e.g. theorem as the agent in (4) or p-value as the agent in 
example (5):  
(4) “Theorem 12 implies the following generalization of Theorem 10.” (2008 Biro et 
al. 352) 
 
(5) “as the p-value indicates” (Bolton et al. 282) 
(6) “Since for both the Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken a ÿ d > 0 and since we assumed 
that 2a ÿ b ÿ c > 0; it follows that…” (Eshel et al. 1999 463) 
 
 
The example (6) shows a very common instance of the use of hedges in the material; when introducing 
any equations or mathematical framework in the text, the phrase assume or suppose, is often used. 
Whichever of these phrases the writer tends to use leads to several cases of that hedge in the text. As 
can be seen in examples (7) to (10), these hedges appear to be a part of a fixed expression in the text, 
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and using a certain hedge can be seen as a stylistic choice from the author(s). In (7) and (8) assume 
is used, and thus was common in the article, and in articles like (9) and (10) suppose was used in the 
same way. 
(7) “First, assume that c .” (Buenrostro et al. 2007 359) 
(8) “…since continuity is not imposed, ti is assumed to satisfy completeness” (Asheim 
2001 457) 
 
(9) “Suppose f(0) = ∞ and f” (Martinelli 2007 330) 
 (10) “Proposition 5 Suppose that m˜ > mj” (Buenrostro et al. 368) 
 
As game theory is originally a mathematical model and resembles pure mathematics in the number 
of stance markers, the fact that mathematics can be seen in the context of stance marker use is 
expected. As is the case in for example assume and suppose, if a stance marker is part of a fixed 
expression in mathematics, that marker appears more often in the article. 
 
5.1.2. Hedges and patterns: separation 
One pattern in the use of hedges was that they were often somehow separated from the actual text. 
This is done in the material by embedding the hedges with the use of commas into a separate clause, 
as in examples (11) and (12), or through the use of parentheses like in (13).  
(11)  “Such an idea is, in our view, misguided.” (Mayo & Wilson 2013 710) 
(12) “We show that, under certain circumstances, policy-makers have the incentives 
to not give in to a protest group” (Buenrostro 2007 p. 374) 
 
(13) “…if one or two countries give in to protestors (maybe because of asymmetries—
protest groups are much more important as voters in some countries than others)” 
1(Buenrostro 373) 
 
It should be noted that cases (14) and (15) are somewhat more unique, as the hedging word item alone 
is included in parentheses instead of having an entire clause separated. This seems to be a completely 
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stylistic choice, and its purpose can be seen to be attempt to detach the hedge from the claim, softening 
it even further. These cases were rare, but as can be seen in (14) and (15) they were not used in only 
a single article. 
 
(14) “In this paper we suggest that (seemingly) altruistic behavior may have also 
originated…” (Eshel et al. 448) 
 
(15) “…since any extensive game of (almost) perfect information…” (Asheim 478) 
In several cases the hedges are separated from the main text in other ways than just embedding them 
within the text. There are multiple instances when hedges are used in a footnote instead of the actual 
text. (16), (17), and (18) are all examples of hedges in separate footnotes on the bottom of the page, 
not included in the main the article. 
(16)  “Assume that the project is always worth carrying out from the point of view of 
the regulator.” (Sun 2011 648) 
 
(17)  “Again, we assume that it is worthwhile to implement the project in both 
periods.” (Sun 649).  
 
(18)  “Many of the SA algorithms for learning in noisy environments assume that one 
can draw finite samples of any size at successive stages of inquiry.” (Mayo & 
Wilson 704) 
 
Separating hedges from the text might serve to add even more caution to the claims made by the 
writer, as Hyland notes that hedges “indicate the writer’s decision to withhold complete commitment 
to a proposition, allowing information to be presented as an opinion rather than accredited fact” 
(2005b 178). Separating the hedging from the actual statement seems to work as a hedging strategy 
of its own, softening the writers’ claim even more. This could suggest that the function of a hedge 
can be amplified in a manner with other linguistic tools than only word items or a grammatical feature.  
As the overall number of hedges in game theory was low compared to other disciplines, 
and the share of them out of all the stance markers was lower too, this can be seen to suggest that 
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game theory is very careful in using hedges, and even in instances that they are used the hedges can 
be separated from the main text of the article through punctuation or footnotes, as seen in the selected 
examples. 
 
5.1.3. Hedges and patterns: clustered hedges 
In the material it was not uncommon for the hedges to appear very close together. Often several 
hedges appear within the same claim. Often this clustering is understandable due to the grammatical 
properties of the hedges, such as auxiliaries (could, would) and modal verbs (seem). Examples (19) 
to (23) show hedges paired in this manner in several texts, using appear, seems, could and would. 
(19) “However, the following, seemingly intuitive, inductive procedure appears to 
indicate that…” (Asheim 2001 p. 465)  
 
(20) “The argument seems to imply…” (Asheim 2001 p. 465)  
 
(21) “The fuel tax protests in Europe seem to suggest that there is a “domino” effect 
which our simple model with linear demand does not capture.” (Buenrostro et al 
2007 p. 373)  
 
(22) “Similarly, one could assume that players have fixed locations in a lattice and, 
hence, each player is more likely to meet her neighbors than any other player” 
(Rivas 2009 538)  
 
(23) “…the resulting interval would be rather wide…” Mayo & Wilson 2013 706)  
 
Other times the clustering of the hedges happens without the grammatical element. This works to 
possibly soften the effect of hedges even more, much the same as separating hedges does. In academic 
writing, taking strong stances can be problematic but this use of several hedges supports the notion 
of academic text as “a persuasive endeavor” (Hyland 2005b 173). In examples (24) to (26) instances 
of clustered paired hedges are presented, and in (27) can be seen a case where the same hedge is 
repeated several times, as repetition can work as a persuasive strategy of its own. 
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(24) “The divergence of trajectories from the equilibrium line seems a bit 
counterintuitive…” (Berger 2001 p. 538) 
 
(25) Nevertheless, the scope of the result remains somewhat narrow on the demand 
side, in that relatively few commonly used demand functions satisfy both 
conditions. (Amir & De Feo 2013 640) ) 
 
(26) “In this regard, perhaps we can eschew the difficulty of fully characterizing the 
set of equilibria…” (2011 Sun 654)  
 
(27) “The individuals in a player's learning neighborhood are likely to play the same 
strategy that he does, since he is likely to imitate them and they him. However, an 
individual interacts with players in his interaction neighborhood, who may or may 
not have imitated him. A strategy is likely to be unbeatable if it earns a higher 
payoff than others in these changing environment (else a player of this strategy is 
likely to switch to another that does better).” (Esher 449)  
 
Hedges can appear together with another hedge, and especially with modal verbs and auxiliaries, but 
there are instances of other paired hedges. Sometimes a same hedge can be repeated consecutively. 
All of these add to soften the hedges even more, and this can be seen to add to the function of the 
hedges as a persuasive strategy. 
 
5.1.4. Hedges and patterns: hedging previous work 
Previous literature mentions how hedges are utilized to “indicate the writer’s decision to withhold 
complete commitment to a proposition, allowing information to be presented as an opinion rather 
than accredited fact” (Hyland 2005b 178), and so they are used as a rhetorical tool for the writer to 
make claims while reducing the force of these claims as absolute. Moreover, hedges “work to balance 
objective information, subjective evaluation and interpersonal negotiation, and this can be a 
powerfully persuasive factor in gaining acceptance for claims” (Hyland 2000, 101). In the RA 
material there are many cases however when the writer chooses to use hedges in relation to previous 
academic claims instead of their own writing. 
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Sometimes hedging previous work is done in the same way as hedging the writer’s own 
work, to not make a too bold of a statement, and to leave room for interpretation. In these cases like 
(28)-(30) previous work can be seen to support the writer’s own claims, yet the hedge is still used. In 
one case, the writer hedges their own previous work in the same way (31). 
(28) “The game frame argument also suggests an alternative explanation to the 
anonymity effect claimed by Hoffman et al.” (Bolton et al. 1998 290) 
 
(29) “Ever since proposed by Schumpeter (1950) and Downs (1957), the “rational 
ignorance hypothesis” has been part of the received wisdom in social sciences.” 
(Martinelli 2007 315) 
 
(30) “Kinship has been suggested as a plausible explanation of altruism and 
cooperative behavior between blood relations.” (Esher 447) 
 
(31) “…the firm’s reaction curve cannot be globally increasing, as argued in some 
detail in Amir (1996a).” (Amir & De Feo 2013 664) 
 
In other cases, such as (32-37), hedging previous work seems to function more as to question that 
work rather than using it to support one’s own statements. These cases show that hedges can be used 
in more than one way. More commonly they are used to leave room for interpretation and to soften 
the statements made by the writer, adding a level of politeness to the text. Although it is not as 
common as hedging one’s own claims, hedges can also be used to cast doubt on previous work, 
presenting them as uncertain or questionable. Using hedges in this manner can be seen to strengthen 
the statements of the authors themselves if their aim is to question some previously made assumptions 
on the topic. 
In (32) to (34) the previous position is questioned on a more general level, as they refer 
to a hypothesis (32), previous literature (33) or an “originally proposed algorithm” (34) 
(32) If the hypothesis is correct, then the percentage of dictators offering $5.00 should 
be the same across the two cells… …If this hypothesis is correct, then dictators 
should tend to give more… (Bolton et al. 278) 
 
40 
 
 
 
(33)  “Importantly, in much of the previous literature on public firms, it is tacitly 
assumed that the public firm can freely choose the type of the game…” (Amir & 
De Feo 630) 
 
(34) “Originally this learning process was proposed as an algorithm for calculating the 
value of a two-person zero-sum game.” (Berger 2001 532) 
 
In (35) to (37) the hedging is more specific, directed at a specific piece of literature (35), a specific 
writer (36), or certain cases (37). 
(35) “Even more tenuous is the claim that the public follower can unilaterally 
implement the Stackelberg equilibrium because of its dominant position, as in 
Beato and Mas-Colell (1984).” (Amir & De Feo 629) 
 
(36)  “He gave intuitive arguments suggesting that altruism should evolve…” (Esher 
464) 
  
(37) “In those cases, beliefs should be updated according to Bayes’ rule” (Buenrostro 
et al 2007 376) 
 
Although hedges have the function of balancing information and opinion, and softening a claim made 
by the author, the material shows that hedges can also be used with previous literature instead of only 
the author’s own claims, or utilized to question opposing views. There are also cases when hedges 
can be found separated from the main text in different ways, or clustered together when making a 
claim.  
 
5.2. Boosters in Game Theory 
The same way as with hedges, the context of the booster is important when discussing if the word 
item is used as a booster or not. For example in (38) the word certain is not used as a booster 
communicating certainty, and has no rhetoric purpose in that way; in (39) the same word item is a 
booster.  
(38) Together, these studies create a certain dissonance. (Bolton et al. 275) 
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(39) For any such event E, mutual certain belief of E implies that E is true: (Asheim, 
469) 
 
The number of boosters ranges from 43 to 193 per article, with a total count of 2234 boosters. This 
gives the number of boosters per 1,000 words as 2.23 or 2.2 if rounded up according to previous 
results. As seen in Table 3, here game theory shows the lowest frequency of boosters out of any 
disciplines, with even lower result than previous lowest number 3.2, from electrical engineering (EE). 
However, as previously discussed the share of boosters out of all the stance markers in game theory 
is quite large, 46.8% of all stance markers found are in the booster category.  
 Table 4. Boosters by discipline  
Feature GTh P Mth Phy Bio ME EE Phil Soc AL Mk AVG 
Boosters (per 1,000 words) 2.2 5.4 6.0 3.9 5.0 3.2 9.7 5.1 6.2 7.1 5.4 
% of stance markers 46.8 50.5 24.0 16.4 25.3 14.8 22.7 16.4 16.7 18.0 25.2 
 
As hedges are used to make the claims presented softer, boosters do the opposite and are used to add 
certainty to claims: “words like clearly, obviously and demonstrate, which allow writers to express 
their certainty in what they say and to mark involvement with the topic and solidarity with their 
audience” (Hyland 2005b, 179). Hedges and boosters have some common ground in their functions. 
 In the RA material there are some noteworthy patterns and examples on the use of the 
boosters. The effect of mathematics is seen in the use of boosters, and, like hedges, boosters can be 
found paired or clustered in the text, and separated from the main text in separate clauses. Boosters 
also often occur in the initial position of a sentence. Boosters can also be found in cases where the 
author is giving in or acknowledging their own shortcomings, but also in the more common manner 
to enforce the claims of the author, or to enforce previous work that supports the article. 
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5.2.1. Boosters and patterns: mathematics 
As was the case with hedges, given that game theory is a mathematical model the effect of 
mathematics in the use of boosters is expected. Although this can be seen as a feature of academic 
text in general, the agent in boosters is rarely the writer or the author, but some other factors, e.g. 
hypothesis, case study, lemma etc. Examples (40) to (44) show some of these instances. Mathematics 
effects the semantic domain which these agents present.  
(40) Since the anonymity hypothesis asserts that… (Bolton et al. 282)   
 
(41) Our case study here shows that it is not impossible to collect such evidence! 
(Buenrostro et al. 375) 
 
(42) The following lemma establishes the first connection between unbeatability and 
winning in a simple frontier state. (Esher et al 1999, 452)  
 
(43) …Theorem 7 proves that m gets his best stable partner again. (Biro et al 355)    
 
(44) Here we provide the theorems which demonstrate which strategies meet the 
various definitions… (Mayo-Wilson et al 2013, 697) 
 
The boosters are also used in close proximity of probabilities, mathematical equations and terms, like 
in examples (45) to (47). In (45) the word strictly refers to numbers representing the payoffs, and in 
(46) to values of F. In (47) the theory on the strategies of x are described with the word obvious. 
(45) We assume that all payoffs in W are strictly positive. (Esher et al 449) 
 
(46) F is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable over some interval (c,c) 
such that 0 ≤ c < c, with F(c) = 0 and F(c) = 1. (Martinelli 317) 
 
(47) It is obvious now that x gets a worse partner under any stable half-matching for 
G than at any stable half-matching for G – v (Biro et al. 351) 
 
In some cases it can be argued that special knowledge on the academic language of mathematics is 
required for the reader to fully grasp the content of the claims, such as in (48), (49), and (50). Here 
the boosters are used with mathematical equations. 
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(48) For any such event E, mutual certain belief of E implies that E is true: KE ¼ K1E 
X K2E JK1E1X K2E2 ¼ E1X E2 ¼ E since, for each i, KiEi ¼ Ei. (Ashmein, 469) 
 
(49) It has thereby been established that si0 A SiðhÞnCiti ðhÞ if si0 differs from 
backward induction only by the action taken at h. (Asheim, 480) 
 
(50) The only difference is that G is not bipartite, so instead of a matching, we maintain 
a half-matching hMv for G − v. (Biro et al 342) 
 
As the agent in the use of boosters in something else than the writer, this can be seen to have an 
argumentative strategy of its own, as the validation for a claim comes from an outside source instead 
of an opinion. As examples (48) to (50) show, even the most theoretical and abstract parts of 
discussion in game theory can use stance markers. 
  
5.2.2. Boosters and patterns: separation 
As was the case with hedges, boosters also were found separated from the main text in embedded 
clauses, such as in (51). Sometimes only the boosting element is used with commas like of course in 
(52).  
(51) …the set N has a largest Cournot equilibrium in the new order, which is clearly 
q0,q1. (Amir & De Feo, 651 in the Appendix) 
 
(52) This probability is, of course, independent of the precise location of the frontier 
on the line. (Esher et al 452) 
 
There are cases when parentheses are used to separate the clause with the booster, as in cases (53) to 
(55). Parentheses instead of commas can be seen to separate the boosters even more from the text. In 
(55) there is a pair of boosters in the parentheses, actually and proved. 
(53) Thus, Schuhmacher’s Thm. 2 (which shows that the backward induction outcome 
obtains with ‘‘high’’ probability for any given ‘‘small’’ e) is strengthened… 
(Asheim, 455) 
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(54) Let M be any finite sequence of RL methods, and let S  , N be any M-network (in 
fact, one need not assume G is connected). (Mayo-Wilson et al, 726) 
 
(55) …in view of the payoff externalities at hand (this is actually formally proved in 
Lemma 4 in Appendix). (Amir & De Feo 2013, 641) 
 
Notably in example (56) the entire independent clause is placed in parentheses from start to finish, 
although it is not even an embedded clause. These cases were rare, and can be seen to be perhaps a 
stylistic choice, although it does separate the booster from the claim, softening its impact. 
(56) For example Andy would like to play mostly with Bill, then with Cliff and finally 
he prefers Daniel the least. (In fact, everybody tries to avoid Daniel.) There is no 
stable solution. (Biro et al 337) 
 
There are also instances in which boosters are placed in the footnotes of the text. Cases (57) to (60) 
are examples of this. Previously with hedges separating the hedges from the text can be suggested to 
soften the impact of the hedge even more, functioning almost as an additional hedging strategy. With 
boosters there is a similar effect; all ways of separating the boosters work as a strategy that softens 
the claim without losing the element of affirmation granted by the booster itself.  
(57) In particular, the explanatory power of the I'm-no-saint hypothesis must be 
interpreted in the context of all the data (Bolton et al. 285) 
 
(58) Aharoni and Fleiner (2003) showed, that the existence of the stable half-matching 
is a consequence of the famous theorem of Scarf (1967). (Biro et al 333) 
 
(59) Assume that the project is always worth carrying out from the point of view of 
the regulator. (2011 Sun, 648) 
 
(60) What the literature on endogenous timing refers to as “basic game” actually 
consists of three distinct games… (Amir & De Feo, 636) 
 
Boosters that are adverbials (obviously, clearly, evidently etc.) and other discourse markers like in 
fact and of course are found in the initial position of a sentence. Due to their grammatical nature this 
is hardly surprising, but initial position can be seen to have also another effect. A boosting element 
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in the initial position allows the booster to enforce the entire following clause, which would not work 
the same as placing the booster in the middle position or in the end of a sentence. Examples (61) to 
(68) are a few examples of boosters in initial position, all displaying a different booster. 
(61) Of course accepting a null hypothesis raises concern about the power of the test. 
(Bolton et al. 281) 
 
(62) In fact, x_ is not uniquely determined for such a point in time. (Berger 534) 
 
(63) Clearly, by our assumptions on payoffs, a tough policy-maker always chooses the 
status quo. (Buenrostro et al. 375) 
 
(64) Obviously, there are at least two equilibria without information acquisition 
(Martinelli 318) 
 
(65) Evidently, the characterization of the pairwise equilibria in the long-run presented 
in the previous section is still valid here. (Rivas 2009 535) 
 
(66) Undoubtedly this result relies a good deal on the quadratic structure of the social 
welfare function… (Sun 2011 654) 
 
(67) Indeed, the private firm’s profit is strictly decreasing in the public firm’s output 
(Amir & De Feo 639) 
 
(68) Clearly, En, . (Mayo-Wilson et al 2013, 718) 
 
The above boosters show how common the booster in an initial position can be. This was also 
different from hedges where hedges in initial position were not a common pattern. Overall, as was 
the case with hedges, boosters are also detached from the main clauses through the use of punctuation 
or footnotes. Although this separation can be seen to soften the effect of the booster, especially in the 
initial position the boosters can be seen to function as boosters for the entire following clause.  
 
5.2.3. Boosters and patterns: clustered boosters 
Boosters, like hedges, are found in pairs or close proximity in some instances. In these cases the use 
of multiple boosters increases affirmation and power, and works as a clear rhetoric strategy when the 
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author is making a claim. In examples (69) to (36) boosters are found in pairs. (69) and (70) have 
some distance in the pair of boosters although they are in the same sentence. 
(69) The experiments by Sonsino et al. [25] and Søvik [26] show that some subjects 
do in fact accept the bet in a slightly more complicated version of this game. 
(Asheim, 467) 
 
(70) Theorem 1 below shows that equilibria with information acquisition for arbitrarily 
large electorates must be characterized by a cutoff cn such that voters acquire 
information (Martinelli 319) 
 
(71), (72) and (73) have closer proximity with the boosters, and in (71) especially the pair decisively 
demonstrate creates strong affirmation to the claim, especially compared to if only one of them would 
be present. 
(71) Both 10Game6Card and 10Game-2Card data decisively demonstrate that… 
(Bolton et al. 285) 
 
(72) It can nevertheless be seen as a learning process for boundedly rational agents, 
and indeed it is established as the standard such learning process. (Berger, 532) 
 
(73) Players do not know this fact and believe that once a friendship relation is broken, 
it will never be set up again. (Rivas 2009, 525) 
 
Example (74) is slightly different as there are three boosters in a single sentence. 
(74) In the next sections we provide conditions for existence of equilibria in the two 
cases of domestic and foreign private firms, and show that the leader’s payoffs are 
indeed always larger than the corresponding Nash payoffs under our assumptions. 
(Amir & De Feo 636-637) 
 
Sometimes in order to explain a model the same term is used multiple times, and this affects the 
occurrence of some boosters. In (75) certainly believing is clearly a fixed phrase used to explain a 
model, so these two boosters occur together multiple times. This repetition itself is a rhetoric tool of 
its own, and the fact that the term is made of boosters can be seen to make the repetition even more 
persuasive.  
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(75) Likewise, since 2 respects the preferences of 1 and, in addition, certainly believes 
that 1 is cautious, it follows that 2 prefers R to L. As a consequence, since 1 
respects the preferences of 2, certainly believes that 2 respects the preferences of 
1, and certainly believes that 2 certainly believes that 1 is cautious, it follows that 
1 deems R infinitely more likely than L. (Asheim 2001, 455) 
Repetition through the use of same booster can be also seen in (76) and (77) with always and must 
respectively. In these cases also a model is explained, and the repetition works as a persuasive 
strategy. This use illustrates how expressing stance relates closely to argumentation and rhetoric. 
(76) In equilibrium, a tough policy-maker always maintains the status quo and a weak 
policy-maker faced with only one protest group will always give in. Protest groups 
will always believe that a policy-maker who changes the policy is weak with 
probability 1. (Buenrostro et al. 357) 
 
(77) …we get that kn = qF(cn)n1/2 and hn = wnn1/2 must satisfy Eqs. 12 and 13. Thus, 
kn must converge to zero as n grows arbitrarily large (Martinelli 338) 
 
In boosters pairing or repetition can be seen to add to the affirming function of boosters, strengthening 
the rhetoric power of the article. This shows that when examining stance in the material, the context 
of boosters also plays a part instead of simply the number of boosters.  
 
5.2.4. Booster and patterns: boosters and writers 
Although boosting is used to enforce one’s own claims and theory, boosters were also found in cases 
where they are used to give in to criticism or acknowledging shortcomings of the author’s own work. 
As making an argument instead of only declaring conclusions is an important part of academic 
discourse, it is not surprising, but this showcases how boosters can be used in very different ways 
than just to enforce or affirm one’s own point. The way the boosters are used in (78) to (82) can be 
argued to actually accomplishing something similar to hedging claims. These kinds of boosters are 
often found in the results or discussion at the end of the articles. 
(78) Identifying such a purpose will no doubt require much further empirical and 
theoretical study. (Bolton et al. 295) 
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(79) It is, however, not yet clear, how these paths converge to L. (Berger 2001, 537) 
 
(80) Clearly, there are several issues that this model has not addressed. (Buenrostro et 
al. 374) 
 
(81) Obviously, as with any stylized model, we have left out many important factors 
in protest movements (Buenrostro et al. 374) 
 
(82) The assumptions validating this conclusion are obviously very general. (Amir & 
De Feo 647) 
 
In one case the booster itself is hedged, with almost surely in (83). This case is only found in one of 
the articles, so it could be argued that it is a stylistic choice. The term is repeated and once again 
seems to be a fixed term or phrase, but is unique as it is constructed with a hedge and a booster.  
(83) By Lemma 3, it follows that, almost surely, every learner in NG(g) has an estimate 
of the EU of a that approaches the actual EU of a in ω. Because a ∈ Aω, by the 
definition of the strategies ∩ a  a plays actions in∈A and LemmaA4ω, it then 
follows that, almost surely, every with probability approaching one. learner in 
NG(g) G [sic] 
Continuing, by Lemma 5, it follows that, almost surely, every learner in NG(g)∩G 
plays plays actions in Aω infinitely often.  (Mayo-Wilson et al, 725) 
 
Boosting can also occur in relation to previous work and background literature. As seen in previous 
discussion, there are cases where the agent in relation to the booster is something different than the 
author (e.g. lemma establishes, Theorem 7 proves), but there are cases where the agent is a writer, 
although not the author of the article itself. Examples (84) to (89) show these cases, where the claims 
made in previous literature are presented more as undisputed facts than for example opinions to be 
interpreted or contested.  
(84) Robinson (1951) proved that under fictitious play the set of Nash equilibria is 
globally attractive… (Berger 533) 
 
(85) Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) show that all cyclic 2  2 bimatrix games are 
strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game. (Berger 536) 
 
(86) They proved that one can always reach a stable matching, if one exists, from an 
arbitrary matching by successively satisfying blocking pairs. (Biro et al 2008 334) 
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(87) Irving (1985) constructed the first polynomial algorithm that finds a stable 
matching if one exists at all (Biro et al 334) 
 
(88) Blum and Rothblum (2002) realized that an agent can only benefit by arriving 
later to the market in the Roth–Vande Vate algorithm. (Biro et al 352) 
 
(89) For example, Marmaros and Sacerdote (2004), using the number of emails 
exchanged between students from Dartmouth College, found that similarity in 
age…” (Rivas 2009, 523)  
 
The cases above are different from instances where the active agents are the writers themselves, like 
in examples (90) and (91). Although these cases seem to explicitly present the writers’ work as facts, 
and thus are very strong claims, they are not unheard of in academic writing. This shows that boosters 
are indeed used very directly to affirm one’s own work. In example (91) the work of previous 
literature is actually questioned by using a booster. 
(90) We find that some friendships emerge in the first periods only because the parties 
involved do not have other alternatives (Rivas 523)  
 
(91) We demonstrate that, whether the uncertainty is small or not, Laffont and Tirole’s 
menu of contracts, giving rise to a non-partitional continuation equilibrium, is not 
optimal. (2011 Sun 646) 
 
As boosters are tools which “allow writers to express their certainty in what they say” (Hyland 2005b, 
179), they also can be used to give certainty to previous literature. Still, there are cases where the 
authors themselves affirm the certainty of their own statement. 
 
5.3. Attitude markers in Game Theory 
The number of attitude markers found in the material was lower than either hedges or boosters. In 
fact, attitude markers were the least common stance marker category found in the RA material. In 
total 643 instances were found in the material, ranging from 14 instances to 154 per article. This gives 
the number of attitude markers per 1,000 as 0.643, or 0.6 if rounded out.  
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 Table 5. Attitude markers by discipline  
Feature GTh P Mth Phy Bio ME EE Phil Soc AL Mk AVG 
Att.mark (per 1,000 words) 0.6 3.9 2.9 5.6 5.5 8.9 7.0 8.6 6.9 3.9 5.3 
% of stance markers 12.8 25.2 15.6 12.2 28.3 25.5 20.8 22.5 23.1 17.5 20.4 
 
Table 5 shows the number of attitude markers and the share of attitude markers out of all the stance 
markers. Although the total number in game theory is low, the share of stance markers is in line with 
natural sciences. The share of boosters and hedges in game theory was similar to pure mathematics 
so attitude markers are different in this manner. 
As was the case with hedges and boosters, the context is necessary to see if a word item 
is truly an attitude marker. Comparing examples (92) and (93) we can see that in (92) the word even 
is an attitude marker with a rhetoric function, but in (93) it is merely referring to the number in 
question.  
(92) …and even dictator 8 appears to be giving in a capricious way… (Bolton et al. 
1998, 283)  
 
(93) When all are seated (an even number) (Bolton et al. 295)  
 
As with hedges and boosters, mathematical context is seen to play a part in game theory and the 
attitude markers found. Also some theoretical terms employ attitude markers, so certain attitude 
markers occur often when those terms are used. As with hedges and boosters, attitude markers are 
found separated from the main text by punctuation, or in footnotes. Attitude markers also occur with 
passive form, or an agent different than the writer, creating some distance between the attitude marker 
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and the author. Finally out of the attitude markers those relating to surprise and uncertainty, as well 
as importance, necessity or emphasis were found. 
 
5.3.1. Attitude markers and patterns: mathematics 
Mathematics has an effect on some of the attitude markers used. In (94) and (95) the mathematical 
context accounts for the use of the attitude markers necessary and natural. 
(94) …so x, y do not satisfy (16) for or which is a necessary condition for x to be an 
unbeatable strategy in hWr;0i and in hW; ri. (Eshel 1999 et al. 462) 
 
(95) …where i is the maximum natural number i ≤ m + 1 (Rivas 2009 528) 
 
In some cases a specific term or theoretical concept is formed with an attitude marker, and this often 
lead to that specific attitude marker being common in the articles. The attitude marker perfect is used 
in some of the instances, e.g. when discussing perfect information, perfect equilibrium or perfect 
matching. In (96) the term is defined after the first use. In Bolton et al. the attitude marker typical is 
used twice, both times with the term typical dictator (97), and in Asheim article the attitude marker 
perfect occurs 24 times, always with either equilibrium or information, as seen in (98) and (99). 
(96) “a perfect stable matching (i.e. a stable matching where no agent is single)” (Biro 
348) 
 
(97)  In this section, we describe a hypothetical decision procedure for a typical 
dictator (292) 
 
(98)  …reflecting that also the pure strategy vector ðM; CÞ is a perfect equilibrium.” 
(Asheim 456) 
 
(99)  A finite extensive game is of perfect information (Asheim 463) 
 
This occurred with other terms too, for example with expected utility or expected cost. In Martinelli 
article, expected occurred 12 times, never without either cost or utility as seen in (100). 
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(100) Moreover, the expected utility of voters in this equilibrium will be larger than 
the expected utility of voters in any equilibria without information acquisition. 
(Martinelli 316) 
 
Mathematics and specific theoretic terms affected the use of attitude markers in the material. As was 
discussed in the theory section, academic language constantly takes a stance and assumes an attitude 
which it attempts to communicate through argumentation and stance markers. As the terms 
themselves include an attitude marker it is clear how objective academic language is not 
straightforward even in purely theoretical discussion as in a way the specialized language itself 
includes taking a stance. 
Attitude markers also occur with and an agent that is something different than the 
author. This was found in boosters also, and can be seen to work in much the same way, distancing 
the attitude marker from the author or author’s own opinion. In (101) to (106) this is done with passive 
form, or using structures like some may feel (105) or one usually considers (106)  
(101) As the assessment increases, it seems reasonable to assume that the measure of 
benefits that accrue from leaving a fixed amount, such as $0.30, will decrease. 
(Bolton et al. 277 
 
(102) In such a setting it is natural to expect reputational externalities (Buenrostro et 
al. 2007, 360) 
 
(103) For the first part of the proposition it suffices to notice that… (Rivas 525) 
 
(104) Hence, some pooling is required in equilibrium. (Sun 2011 650) 
 
(105) Some may feel that strategic advantage can be fairly used only if it was in some 
sense fairly gained (Bolton et al. 292) 
 
(106) When dealing with (evolutionary) game dynamics, one usually considers either 
intragroup interactions between individuals of the same type… (Berger 528) 
 
In (105) and (106) whether the writer agrees with the stance taken is open to interpretation. Using 
noun phrases like the mixed duopoly (107), this randomization (108), or requirement (109) also 
disassociates the author’s own stance on the matter. 
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(107) …the mixed duopoly admits a Cournot equilibrium. (2013 Amir & De Feo 645) 
 
(108) This randomization requires that… (Buenrostro et al. 376) 
 
(109) Proper consistency will be based on three requirements: The first of these 
ensures that each player plays the game G, the second requirement ensures that 
each player takes all opponent strategies into account (is cautious), while the third 
requirement ensures… (Asheim 460) 
 
Although the examples above show how the attitude marker can be separated from the author’s own 
attitude, there are cases in which the author is actively the one taking the stance. Examples (110) to 
(112) show that stance taking can sometimes be clear, and the authors position themselves with the 
attitude they express. 
(110) This paper provides a pivotal voter model with costly information that predicts 
that only a small fraction of voters acquires information in large elections–a 
prediction we find entirely acceptable. (2007 Martinelli 332) 
 
(111) Throughout the paper, we allow the basic game to have multiple pure-strategy 
Nash equilibria (Amir & De Feo 640)  
 
(112) We believe that the most important part of our results is… (Mayo-Wilson 714) 
 
Some of the same issues were found as with previous stance markers, such as the effect of 
mathematics or specific theoretical terms in the text. The authors also can disassociate themselves 
from the attitude marker, but as seen from the examples this was not always the case 
 
5.3.2. Attitude markers and patterns: separation 
Compared to hedges and boosters, the attitude markers were not found as often separated through 
punctuation. There were some cases, for example in (113) in initial position, and (114) separated with 
commas. In (115) there is separation through placing the attitude marker inside apostrophes. 
(113) As usual, let F (preferred to) and @F (indifferent to) denote the asymmetric and 
symmetric parts of F. (Asheim 467) 
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(114) As to the intuition behind the emergence of private leadership here, as usual, the 
private firm expands output (Amir & De Feo 644) 
 
(115) …depending on this neighbor's strength to project his seed to the vacant location 
and with no reference to the dead individual or his `wishes'. (Eshel et al. 465) 
 
Attitude markers were found in footnotes, like boosters and hedges. Footnotes seem to offer the writer 
possibilities to take stance or make an argument while keeping it separate from the main text. 
Footnotes appear to be a widely used stylistic feature of game theory, as examples (116) to (119) are 
all from different writers yet include an attitude marker in the footnote. In (118) there are several 
attitude markers in one sentence, and in (119) the use of the attitude marker good seems to be an 
explicit value judgment in academic writing, which is perhaps often seen as neutral or objective. 
(116) Even more tenuous is the claim that… (Amir & De Feo 629) 
 
(117) …a [italics in text] obtained from conditioning on a third common measure; they 
are essentially unrelated. (Mayo-Wilson et al 2013 698) 
 
(118) It is reasonable to apply such a method, since even to approximate the minimal 
number of the blocking pairs for general graphs is theoretically hard (Biro 333)  
 
(119) The literature warns, however, that if there are many ties in the rankings ± as is 
the case in our data ± then the normal approximation may not be very good (Bolton 
et al. 282) 
 
Some attitude markers were found in acknowledgements at the end of the text, and here the stance 
taking does not seem to be connected to the theory or argument, but is used to show appreciation or 
gratitude to others involved in the writing process of the article. Examples (120) and (121) show two 
of these cases, with (120) from a footnote and (121) from acknowledgement at the end of the text. 
(120) The first author wishes to thank the help of the GNFM (Eshel et al. 448) 
 
(121) We thank also the anonymous referee for his careful reading and constructive 
suggestions. (Biro 2008 356) 
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The attitude markers show same strategies of separating the stance taking from the main text or main 
clause as hedges and boosters previously. It should be noted that there were more varied examples 
from both hedges and boosters, and although this thesis does not list the number of cases in different 
contexts, a closer analysis on this might be a topic for future research. 
 
5.3.3 Attitude markers and patterns: the attitudes 
Although there are several attitude markers in the text which communicate different attitudes and 
listing all of them is not the purpose of this study, this section will illustrate some of these cases. 
Hyland mentions that attitude markers are used in “conveying surprise, agreement, importance, 
frustration, and so on, rather than commitment” (2005b, 180). As there were several instances of 
attitude markers in the text not relating to commitment, the attitude markers highlighting importance 
or necessity of a certain matter were found in several articles, as well as attitudes of surprise or 
uncertainty. 
 With importance or necessity the writer seems to argue for the validity of their claim or 
theory. Like boosters, the attitude markers such as important, necessary or noteworthy all seem to 
defend or emphasize what is presented. Examples (122) to (125) show some of these attitude markers. 
(122) The generalization of the concept of the Wright manifold to extensive form 
games also plays an important role in the analysis (Berger 532) 
 
(123) To do so, although they may be of great importance, we abstract away from 
collective action problems (Buenrostro 354) 
 
(124) “heterogeneity in the voters’ costs of acquiring and processing information 
seems to be a necessary ingredient for satisfactory models” (Martinelli 338) (in 
the appendix part) 
 
(125) On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the the [sic] scope of the result is totally 
unrestricted on the cost side. (Amir & De Feo 641) 
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With uncertainty or surprise the effect of the attitude marker can be seen to in a way hedge the 
proposed claim or clause: the writer displays some element of uncertainty or surprise as if to show 
that they are open to criticism themselves. There is a difference with the attitude markers and hedging, 
as can be seen when comparing for example (126) and (127): in the first the attitude to the unexpected 
is more positive and in the latter somewhat more neutral.  
(126) Fortunately this happens to be the case for 2  2 bimatrix games. (Berger 535) 
 
(127) …that is, we can check whether the two hypothesized effects tend to reinforce 
one another or cancel one another out or possible have some unexpected effects. 
(Bolton et al. 278) 
 
In other cases also an attitude marker is used to show that there is something surprising in the claim 
that is made, such as in (128) and (129). In (128) the surprise hedges the claim, while in (129) the use 
of striking is not as neutral of an attitude to the surprising element. 
(128) More surprisingly, Beggs’ reinforcement learner might not converge if placed 
in the wrong social circumstance. (Mayo-Wilson et al 696) 
 
(129) Note the striking difference between our stability result and the one of 
Gaunersdorfer, Hofbauer, and Sigmund (1991)… (Berger 538) 
 
The attitude markers sometimes seem to complete the same function as hedges or boosters, but they 
enable different degrees of neutrality towards the claims or results discussed. Emphasizing the 
importance, necessity or surprise are only some of the cases found, but illustrate some of the cases 
where the writer takes a stance to what is claimed through the use of attitude markers. 
 
5.4. Self-mentions in Game Theory 
Self-mentions seem to be the most simple to list, as they are specific word items and not dependent 
on the context to the extent as previous stance markers. However, an analysis on the context is 
necessary, especially with the first person singular pronoun I, as the letter is often used in 
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mathematical context: “Individual i will switch to the strategy1 used by individual j” (Eshel et al 
1999, 450). 
 The total number of self-mentions in the sample was 846, ranging from 22 to 187 per 
article. The number of self-mentions per 1,000 words is then 0.846, or 0.8 when rounded. A majority 
of these came from the pronouns we or us, a total of 694 instances, or 82% of all the self-mentions. 
Table 6 shows the number and share of self-mentions, and as discussed previously show in game 
theory the share of self-mentions exceeds the average.  
 Table 6. Self-mentions by discipline  
Feature GTh P Mth Phy Bio ME EE Phil Soc AL Mk AVG 
Self-mnt. (per 1,000 words) 0.8 0.8 5.5 3.4 1.0 3.3 5.7 4.3 4.4 5.5 3.5 
% of stance markers 17.0 7.5 22.0 14.3 5.1 15.3 13.3 13.8 11.8 13.9 13.4 
 
Self-mentions are an explicit way for the writer to insert themselves in the text, as Hyland (2009) 
notes that “the presence or absence of explicit author reference is therefore a conscious choice by 
writers to adopt a particular stance and disciplinary-situated authorial identity” (76). As Hyland 
mentions the authorial identity associated in the explicit presence of the author, self-mentions can be 
seen as instances of assuming a form of this authorial identity. In this section the cases of self-
mentions from the material are highlighted. As the use of first person plural was the most common 
way to use self-mentions, in this section these will be discussed alongside other cases of different 
self-mentions. 
The most noteworthy pattern in self-mentions in the material is the difference between 
the uses of singular or plural form. When a self-mention is used as a stance markers, the use of the 
pronoun we is extremely common in the RA material. Cases like (130) and (131) are examples of this 
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use of the plural form. In (131) it should be noted that the pronoun us occurred 10 times in the article, 
always in the construction let us x.  
(130) In particular, even though the experiment completely shatters one of our initial 
hypotheses… (Bolton et al 1998, 270) 
 
(131) Let us consider the above sequence with an extra stopping rule (Biró et al 351) 
 
In some instances the plural form we was used even when there is only one author. Cases like this 
can be seen as either conforming to a convention of using we in academic writing, or a strategy to 
include the reader to the narration. Examples (132) and (133) are examples of single author using the 
plural form. 
(132) By a role game we mean a symmetric two player game based on a bimatrix 
game” (Berger 528) 
 
(133) We first construct a sequence, indexed by n, of -belief systems. By Def. 3 this 
involves, for each n and for each player i, a finite set of types – which we below 
denote by Ti00… (Asheim 472) 
 
There are also cases when the single author uses a singular form in the text. Sometimes there is still 
some level of distance, like in example (134) through the use of the author instead of I. As (135) 
shows, the first person singular was used in some cases although as mentioned, us and we are much 
more common. It could be argued that the use of I displays a stronger authorial stance taking, and 
authors are likely to avoid this in order to keep a more objective or diplomatic position in their writing.  
(134) The author performs simulations and finds that groups of players of the same 
type tend to form friendships. (Rivas 523) 
 
(135) In my characterization of proper rationalizability in two-player games I drop 
property 1., which is an equilibrium assumption; instead I assume that there is 
common certain belief of property 2., which I call proper consistency. (Asheim 
2001 454) 
 
Footnotes and acknowledgements at the end of the text seem to allow much more explicit stance 
taking, as was the case in some of the attitude markers expressing gratitude or appreciation. It could 
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be argued that acknowledgements can be examined as a separate form of academic writing than 
research article, but as these acknowledgements were included at the end of the text or in a footnote 
the same way as other footnotes in the article they are included here. Examples (136) and (137) show 
self-mentions in this use. Although in other parts of the texts the plural form was used here the authors 
use the explicit I. 
(136) I am indebted to Josef Hofbauer for many helpful discussions. (Berger 2001 527) 
 
(137) I would like to acknowledge Nejat Anbarci, Howard P. Marvel, James Peck, 
Huanxing Yang, Lixin Ye and two anonymous referees for their valuable 
comments. All remaining errors are my own. (Sun 655) 
 
In example (138) both the plural and the singular form are used to distinguish each author’s own 
stance. However the singular first person pronoun is avoided in this part also. 
(138) We wish to thank Vijay Krishna, the Associate Editor and two anonymous 
referees for very helpful suggestions, as well as audiences at CORE, University of 
Strathclyde, Università degli studi di Pavia, 2007 EARIE Conference in Valencia, 
2008 ESEM Conference in Milano, and 2009 PET conference in Galway. The 
second author gratefully acknowledges financial support from Fondazione Alma 
Mater Ticinensis - Pavia, project ‘The governance of markets and firms after the 
global crisis’. The scientific responsibility is assumed by the authors. (Amir & 
DeFeo 649) 
 
Compared to other stance markers, self-mentions did not show the same kind of patterns but as they 
express the presence of the author and not any particular stance this is somewhat expected. The use 
of plural form even with single authors can be seen as either a convention or a rhetoric strategy to 
persuade the reader by including the reader. However, the explicit singular form was not absent, and 
is used especially in footnotes acknowledging or thanking others. 
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6. Conclusions and Further Research  
Stance is a vast topic that has been classified and discussed through different approaches. This thesis 
has used the four categories of hedges, boosters, attitude markers and self-mentions to enable 
comparison and framework from other studies on stance markers and academic disciplines. Results 
were discussed mostly through examples from the RA material but some discussion on overall results 
was included 
In this thesis the number of stance markers in RA material relating to game theory has 
been presented. The low number of stance markers might suggest that game theory is more hesitant 
than other disciplines in taking a stance, but as the sample size was small and the material in every 
discipline different, the data do not support this strong of a statement. In pure mathematics “the 
presence of attitude markers and boosting devices” was found to be somewhat surprising, “further 
debunking the myth that mathematical discourse is purely objective, and conveyed by standardized 
code” (McGrath & Kuteeva 2011, 170). The same can apply to game theory as it is a mathematical 
model, but still shows occurrences of stance markers, further emphasizing objectivity in even 
mathematics as a myth. 
The total number of stance markers in the RA material is noticeably lower than in any 
other discipline, but the share of the four categories shows a unique structure in their use, which is 
comparable with the way stance markers in other disciplines are formed. Game theory resembles pure 
mathematics in terms of low overall number of stance markers and the share of boosters and hedges, 
but the share of attitude markers and self-mentions was more similar to some natural sciences and 
different from pure mathematics. Although there are similarities with pure mathematics and natural 
sciences in some regards, the results suggest that the clear division to natural sciences versus social 
sciences and humanities might be a simplistic one. 
 
61 
 
 
 
Some patterns on the context of the stance markers were discussed. As this was not 
discussed in the background literature, comparisons could not be made between disciplines, but this 
is not essential to the purpose of discussing context of use. Especially boosters and hedges can 
strategically be used to support or soften either the writers’ own statements, background literature 
supporting their claims, or statements the writer wishes to contradict. For further research, to focus 
on the context of use might yield more results in differences of stance between different academic 
disciplines.  
 The use of footnotes seems to be a convention in RA relating to game theory, and they 
are used to employ stance makers while separating them from the main text. In hedges and boosters 
the tendency to separate the markers from the main text was found in several instances. Looking at 
the use of footnotes and disciplines could be a topic in further research on disciplinary differences to 
see whether disciplines which do not use footnotes as much have different strategies to separate stance 
markers from the text. 
 The semantic field of mathematics affected the use of agents in stance markers in 
hedges, boosters and attitude markers. The stance markers in game theory show how academic 
language makes claims and arguments through softening or enforcing them, or through attitudes like 
necessity, importance or surprise. In self-mentions the use of plural form we is very commonly used 
even when there is a single author, and can be seen to be an academic convention.  
The single biggest issue in drawing conclusions from the results is that for a more 
statistically viable result a much larger set of analyzable data should be used, for example in the form 
of a corpus. Since this study concerns itself with illustrating the presence of rhetorical language use 
in academic research articles in the particular field of game theory, the purpose is not to come to a 
quantitative, definitive result. Rather, by identifying and classifying the instances of stance markers 
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the study discusses how game theory, a field developed from a mathematical model, utilizes stance 
markers. 
 In further studies it could also be fruitful to examine for example differences in the use 
of stance markers by seasoned academics and writers with little published work. The overall 
frequency of the stance markers, as well as their distribution could be of interest. For example, is it 
more likely for a newly published writer to make stronger claims, or having to use more hedging to 
argue their research? The use of different attitude markers and what stance they represent might also 
be a topic for further research. With self-mentions the use of singular forms might also prove to be 
worthwhile issue. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
63 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
The material 
Amir, Rabah and Giuseppe De Feo. 2013. “Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly” in International 
Journal of Game Theory (2014) 43: 629–658 
Asheim, Geir B. 2001. “Proper rationalizability in lexicographic beliefs” in International Journal of 
Game Theory (2001) 30: 453–47 
Berger, Ulrich. 2001. “Best response dynamics for role games” in International Journal of Game 
Theory (2001) 30: 527–538 
Biró, Peter. Katarína Cechlárová and Tamás Fleiner. 2007. “The dynamics of stable matchings and 
half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems” in International Journal of Game 
Theory (2008) 36: 333–352 
Bolton, Gary E. Elena Katok and Rami Zwick. 1998. “Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus 
acts of kindness” in International Journal of Game Theory (1998) 27: 269-299 
Buenrostro, Lucia. Amrita Dhillon and Myrna Wooders. 2007 “Protests and reputation” in 
International Journal of Game Theory (2007) 35: 353–377 
Eshel, Ilan. Emilia Sansone and Avner Shaked. 1999. “The emergence of kinship behavior in 
structured populations of unrelated individuals” in International Journal of Game Theory (1999) 28: 
447-463 
Martinelli, César. 2007. “Rational ignorance and voting behavior” in International Journal of Game 
Theory (2007) 35: 315–335 
Mayo-Wilson, Conor. Kevin Zollman and David Danks 2013. “Wisdom of crowds versus groupthink: 
learning in groups and in isolation” in International Journal of Game Theory (2013) 42: 695–723 
Rivas, Javier. 2009. “Friendship selection” in International Journal of Game Theory (2009) 38: 521–
538 
Sun, Ching-jen. 2011. “A note on the dynamics of incentive contracts” in International Journal of 
Game Theory (2011) 40: 645–653 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 
 
 
 
Works cited 
Barton, Ellen L. 1993. “Evidentials, Argumentation, and Epistemological Stance” College English, 
55, 7: 745-769 
Becher, Tony, and Paul R. Trowler. 2001 Academic Tribes and Territories 2nd edition. Great Britain: 
The Society of Research into Higher Education & Open University Press 
Benz, Anton, Gerhard Jäger and Robert van Rooi. 2006. “An Introduction to Game Theory for 
Linguist” In Game Theory and Pragmatics. Palgrave Studies in Pragmatics, Language and 
Cognition, 1-82 Palgrave Mcmillan 
Biber, Douglas, Stig Johansson, Geoffrey Leech, Susan Croft, and Edward Finegan. 1999.  Longman 
Grammar of Spoken and Written English Pearson Education Limited 
Biber, Douglas. 2006. University Language: A Corpus-Based Study of Spoken and Written Registers. 
Philadelphia, PA, USA: John Benjamins Publishing Company 
Binmore, Ken. 2007. Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford, GBR: Oxford University 
Press, UK 
Bowles, Hugo. 2012 “Analyzing Languages for Specific Purposes Discourse.” The Modern Language 
Journal, Vol 96 43-58, January 2012 
Chafe, Wallace. 1986. “Evidentiality in English Conversation and Academic writing” in 
Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology ed. Chafe, Wallace & Johanna Nichols. Ablex 
Publishing Corporation, the United States 
Cockcroft, Robert and Susan M. Cockcroft 1992. Persuading People: An Introduction to Rhetoric. 
The Macmillan Press Ltd. 
Dressen-Hammouda, Dacia. 2008. “From Novice to Disciplinary Expert: Disciplinary Identity and 
Genre Mastery.” English for Speciﬁc Purposes Vol 27, 233–252 
Gates, Scott and Brian D. Humes. 1997. Games, Information, and Politics: Applying Game Theoretic 
Models to Political Science University of Michigan Press 
Gray, Bethany, Douglas Biber and Turo Hiltunen. 2011. “The Expression of Stance in Early (1665-
1712) Publications of the Philosophical Transactions and Other Contemporary Medical Prose: 
Innovations In A Pioneering Discourse.” in Medical Writing in Early Modern English, ed. Irma 
Taavitsainen and Päivi Pahta. Cambridge University Press, New York 
Gray, Bethany and Douglas Biber. 2012 “Current Conceptions of Stance” in Stance and Voice in 
Written Academic Genres, ed. Ken Hyland and Carmen Sancho Guinda. Palgrave Macmillan 
Hiltunen, Turo. 2010. Grammar and Disciplinary Culture: A Corpus-based Study. Helsingin 
yliopisto 2010 
Hyland, Ken. 1999. Disciplinary Discourses: Writer Stance in Research Articles 99-121. Longman 
Hyland, Ken. 2000. Disciplinary Discourses. Pearson Education Limited 
Hyland, Ken. 2005a. “Appendix: Metadiscourse items investigated” in Metadiscourse. 218-224 MBG 
Books Ltd  
65 
 
 
 
Hyland, Ken. 2005b. “Stance and engagement: a model of interaction in academic discourse” 
Discourse Studies, Vol 7 (2); 173-192 SAGE publications 
Hyland, Ken and Polly Tse 2007. “Is there an “academic Vocabulary”?” in TESOL Quarterly, 41(2), 
235– 54. 
Hyland, Ken and Marina Bondi. 2009 Academic Discourse. London, GBR: Continuum International 
Publishing 
Hyland, Ken and Carmen Sancho Guinda. 2012 “Introduction: a Context Sensitive Approach to 
Stance and Voice” in Stance and Voice in Written Academic Genres, ed. Ken Hyland and Carmen 
Sancho Guinda. Palgrave Macmillan 
Jasinski, James. 2001. Sourcebook on Rhetoric: Key Concepts in Contemporary Rhetorical Studies. 
Sage Publications. 
McGrath, Lisa. and Maria Kuteeva. 2012 “Stance and Engagement in Pure Mathematics Research 
Articles: Linking Discourse Features to Disciplinary Practices.” in English For Specific Purposes, 
Vol 31. 161-173. 
Nash, Walter 1989. Rhetoric. Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1989. 
Ordeshook, Peter C. 1986. Game Theory and Political Theory. Cambridge University Press 
Silver, Marc. 2012. “Voice and Stance across Disciplines in Academic Discourse” in Stance and 
Voice in Written Academic Genres, ed Ken Hyland and Carmen Sancho Guinda. Palgrave Macmillan 
Swales, John M. 1990 Genre Analysis – English in Academic and Research Setting. Cambridge 
University Press. Great Britain, Glasgow 
Tardy, Christine M. 2012 “Current Conceptions of Voice” in Stance and Voice in Written Academic 
Genres, ed. Ken Hyland and Carmen Sancho Guinda. Palgrave Macmillan 
von Neumann, John, and Oskar Morgenstern. 1944. Princeton Classic Editions : Theory of Games 
and Economic Behavior. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press, 2007 
Zwiers, Jeff. 2014. Building Academic Language: Essential Practices for Meeting Common Core 
Standards in Content Classrooms, Grades 5-12 (2nd Edition). Somerset, NJ, USA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
Appendix: Stance Markers used 
 
Hedges: 
about 
almost 
allege 
allegedly 
apparent 
apparently 
appear(s/ed) 
approximately 
argue(s/ed) 
around 
assume(s/ed) 
broadly 
can, 
certain amount 
certain extent 
certain level 
claim(s/ed) 
could(n’t) 
doubt 
doubtful/ly 
essentially 
estimate(s/d) 
fairly 
feels 
felt 
frequently 
from my perspective 
from our perspective 
 
from this perspective 
generally 
guess 
hint 
indicate(s/ed) 
in general 
in most cases 
in most instances 
in my opinion 
in my view 
in this view 
in our opinion 
in our view 
imply, 
improbable 
improbably 
indicate 
insinuate 
kind of 
largely 
likely 
mainly 
may 
maybe 
might 
mostly 
often 
on the whole 
ought 
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perhaps 
plausible 
plausibly 
possible 
possibly 
postulate(s/ed) 
presumable 
presumably 
probable 
probably 
propose 
quite 
rather x 
relatively 
roughly 
seems 
should 
sometimes 
somewhat 
suggest(s/ed) 
suppose(s/ed) 
suspect(s/ed) 
sort of 
tend to 
tended to 
tends to 
to my knowledge 
typical 
typically 
think 
uncertain 
uncertainly 
unclear 
unclearly 
unlikely 
usually 
would 
wouldn’t 
 
 
Boosters: 
absolutely 
actually 
always 
apparently 
assert 
believe(s/ed) 
beyond doubt 
certain 
certainly 
clear 
clearly 
command 
conclusively 
decidedly 
decisively  
definite 
definitely 
demonstrate(s/ed) 
doubtless 
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emphasize 
establish 
established 
evident 
evidently 
find 
finds 
for certain 
found 
guarantee 
have to 
in fact 
incontestable 
incontestably 
incontrovertible 
incontrovertibly 
indeed 
indisputable 
indisputably 
inevitably 
insist 
know 
known 
mainly 
maintain,  
must 
never 
no doubt 
obvious 
obviously 
of course 
probably 
prove(s/d) 
realize(s/ed) 
really,  
shall,  
show 
showed 
shown 
shows 
strictly 
sure 
surely 
think 
thinks 
thought 
true 
truly 
undeniable 
undeniably 
undisputedly 
undoubtedly 
universally 
usually 
will 
without doubt 
won’t 
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Attitude markers 
absurd 
accept 
acceptable 
adamant 
admirable 
admirably 
admire 
admit 
admittedly 
afraid  
agree 
agreeably 
agreed  
agrees 
allow 
amazed 
amazing 
amazingly 
anticipate 
appropriate 
appropriately 
approve 
astonished 
astonishing 
astonishingly  
bad 
blame 
careful 
complain 
confusedly 
correctly 
curious 
curiously 
deny 
deserving 
desirable 
desirably 
desire 
desperately 
disagree 
disagreed 
disagrees 
disappointed 
disappointing 
disappointingly 
disturbingly 
dramatic 
dramatically 
dream 
ensure 
essential 
essentially 
even x 
excellent 
excessive 
exciting 
expect 
expected 
expectedly  
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extraordinary  
fair 
faithfully 
fear 
feasible 
feel 
fitting 
forget 
fortunate 
fortunately 
frankly speaking 
fundamental 
glad 
gladly 
good 
gratifying 
great 
happily 
hope 
hopeful 
hopefully 
humbly 
ideal 
important 
importantly 
inappropriate 
inappropriately 
incredible 
indifferently 
interesting 
interestingly 
intolerably 
ironically 
marvel 
natural 
necessary 
noteworthy 
noticeable 
obligatory 
odd 
peculiar 
perfect 
prefer 
preferable 
preferably 
preferred 
pretend 
proper 
reasonable 
reflect 
regrettably 
remarkable 
remarkably 
require 
resolve 
rightly 
sadly 
satisfactory 
sensible 
shocked 
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shocking 
shockingly 
speculative 
strange 
striking 
strikingly 
suffice 
sufficient 
surprised 
surprising 
surprisingly 
trust 
typical 
unbelievable 
unbelievably 
understandable 
understandably 
unexpected 
unexpectedly 
unfortunate 
unfortunately 
unhappily 
unusual 
unusually 
usual 
willingly 
wisely 
wish 
wonder 
worry 
 
 
 
Self-mentions 
I 
me 
mine 
my 
our 
the author 
the author’s 
the writer 
the writer’s 
us 
we 
 
